Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
source of British knowledge of German plans to attack in Egypt on or about
August 25, 1942. Neither Rommel nor anyone else followed the question
forcefully.
As with any source of intelligence, ULTRA was only as good as those who
used it. Possession of ULTRA material did not necessarily result in its proper
interpretation. For example, knowledge of the opposing air and ground OB
convinced Allied commanders that the enemy would remain on the defensive
as the new year opened. Having thus attributed to the Germans a course of
action which stemmed from their own interpretation of the right thing to do,
ULTRA possessors were ill prepared for the series of offensive thrusts that began
in late January and culminated in the near disaster at Kasserine Pass.248 In this
instance, concurrent changes in the Axis command structure had muddied the
intelligence picture. It reflected once more the danger of neglecting the
possibility that the enemy’s analysis of his capability and of the overall situation
might lead him to courses of action wholly different from those anticipated.
Consequently, developments in January-February 1943 illustrate the important
point that throughout the war ULTRA almost always provided better information
on the German enemy’s quantitative status rather than providing insight into
German enemy commanders’ intentions.
In the early weeks of TORCH, the primary contribution of the Allied air
forces was close air support for advancing ground forces and airfield attacks to
reduce the enemy’s buildup. Doolittle’s American Twelfth Air Force had played
only a small part in the TORCH invasion. Subsequently concentrated in western
Algeria and Morocco in anticipation of possible Axis operations from Spain, the
Twelfth had not been heavily involved in the initial eastward thrust. The rapid
German buildup and the shift of American ground forces to the southern flank
of the Allied line pulled American air units east.
The need to slow the insertion of Axis units and supplies into Tunisia led
to attacks on enemy ports in Africa. Through the winter of 1942 and spring of
1943 these initial efforts at interdiction evolved into one of air power’s major
roles in North Africa. With NATAF concentrating on defensive and offensive
support for ground operations, the heavy and medium bombers and their escorts
of the NASAF pursued their responsibility for interdiction of Axis sea, land, and
air lines of communication and supply to and from T~nisia.’~’ Heavy and
medium bombers as well as A-20s, DB-7s, and P-38s hit Tunisian ports in
December, but the increasing density of enemy defenses drove the attackers to
higher altitudes and eventually limited these strikes to the. B-17s and B-24s.
Although the heavies were not used exclusively in this role, they tended to focus
on port facilities and vessels in port, whereas the medium bombers and their
escorts sought out ships at sea.
Despite the advantages ULTRA provided, the antishipping campaign started
slowly. Throughout the winter, bad weather made it difficult to launch the force,
let alone to see and hit a target. Ships at sea proved difficult targets even when
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