Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
White was quite aggressive in trying to set up his A-2 operation as a
separate and independent function, but it was an almost constant struggle. On
February 7,1944, White wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff to comment on both
General Arnold’s and his own lack of confidence in and dissatisfaction with the
AAF’s air intelligence. Arnold’s specific feelings of unease centered on
preparation for the B-29 air campaign against Japan, upon which he had staked
his reputation and the Air Forces’ future. Arnolc had earlier made these feelings
known when he had assigned the COA to review the A-2’s work. Some in the
A-2 office, including possibly Sorenson himself, resented the intrusion of the
outside analysts. The commanding general’s feelings probably contributed to
Sorenson’s reassignment in October 1943, but Arnold continued to find fault
with his intelligence office. The extent to which Arnold’s unhappiness, if any,
contributed to Bissell’s short stay as A-2 is hard to judge. He was replaced by
White in January 1944.’l It was White who set about trying to effect a major
refocusing of the A-2 office toward the war against Japan and postwar
operations.
White went further than just seconding Arnold’s apprehensions, expressing
his belief that the A-2 had too many extraneous functions and an excessive and
needless interest in Europe, where McDonald’s people were doing good work
with the RAF, and that it was poorly prepared to assure good quality air
intelligence analyses. Hardly had the ink dried on the first letter when White
again wrote to the Chief of Air Staff to discuss his views of the relationship
between G-2 and A-2. In the latter correspondence, White pointed out that
Arnold needed a completely integrated and uninhibited intelligence staff, and
until he got such, he could not be a full partner on the JCS. Whereas the Army
and Navy chiefs had independent intelligence, White contended that the AAF
was largely dependent upon G-2 and was organized on a pre- 1941 basis. By the
latter remark, he seemed to mean that the A-2 lacked permanent status within
the Army and that it was not equal to G-2 and ONI. In closing, White advocated
the transfer of all air intelligence responsibility from G-2 to A-2. The proposal
faced an enormous bureaucratic resistance from well-entrenched opponents.
White’s proposal failed, for to have allowed the transfer would also have raised
the question of an independent Air Force. That idea was premature in the midst
of a war for which the military had just become organized and fully effective.’*
White’s focus, and Arnold’s too, remained on the war with Japan. They
believed that long-range air power could be decisive in the Pacific and that
demonstrating it could set the stage for postwar Air Force independence. To
pursue that issue and to plan appropriately, the two men needed adequate
strategic targeting information, and their subordinate commanders and A-2s in
the field needed good tactical intelligence. In an air war, where both sides had
fast-moving, destructive operations, radio intelligence became increasingly
important.