Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
ground operations differed considerably from that required for strategic air
operations. The intimate relationship between air and ground action, and the
transient nature of tactical targets, necessitated an intelligence organization
structured for the rapid collection, evaluation, and distribution of information.
In contrast to the strategic air forces, for whom the Luftwuffe remained a
serious-if weakened-adversary, tactical airmen and the armies they supported
went about their tasks largely unconcerned with attack from the air.lY5
The principle of colocated air and ground equivalent headquarters
contributed significantly to the effective application of air intelligence to the
land war. Except for brief periods of rapid movement, General Hoyt Vandenberg’s
Ninth Air Force remained with General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army
Group, while IX TAC and later XIX and XXIX TAC were colocated with First,
Third, and Ninth Armies, respectively. For the invasion of southern France in
August (Operation DRAGOON), XI1 TAC was shifted from Italy to support the
American Seventh Army and later the Allied Sixth Army Group as part of First
Tactical Air Force (Prov.). Because of the relationship between the tactical air
commands and the armies they supported, much of the day-to-day decision
making, including targeting, took place between the headquarters of those
organizations. Ninth Air Force was responsible for providing overall policy and
direction and for reallocating subordinate units to meet special operational
requirements. Unless directed specifically by SHAEF, the Ninth Air Force
commander or his representative (usually the director of operations) made air
operations decisions at the morning meeting held with 12th Army Group. These
decisions routinely were based on the intel1igence.report and Bradley’s plan of
attack.’96
Ninth Air Force made simultaneous daily mission decisions, since it
controlled the IX Bomber Command’s eleven medium-bomber groups. Until
September, much of the intelligence guidance for the employment of the
medium bombers came from a special security officer assigned to the target
section of AEAF’s advanced headquarters. From this position Maj. Lucius Buck
coordinated with 12th Army Group Targets, Ninth Air Force A-2 and A-3,
SHAEF G-2 Targets, and the Air Ministry to blend ULTRA, tactical photointerpretation
reports, ground reports, and POW interrogations into tactical target
lists. With the disbandment of HQ AEAF and the incorporation of its intelligence
section into the new Air Staff, SHAEF, Buck was assigned to Ninth Air
Force, but he operated from the Air Ministry where he performed the same
functions. By September the focus of his efforts, and those of the IX Bomber
Command, was petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) depots; ammunition
dumps; and military transport parks. At the beginning of December, USSTAF
and SHAEF as well as Ninth Air Force and the tactical air commands received
Buck’s target lists.1y7
From the time IX TAC landed at Normandy on D+2, the first tactical air
command to do so, intelligence was fully integrated into air-ground operations.
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