Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Taking the Offensive
field armies, but to Japan itself. Shortly after Doolittle’s attack alarmed the
Japanese homeland, the Japanese Army decided to clean out bases in Chekiang
and Szechwan that could be used by the Americans and to capture railway
equipment that they needed elsewhere in China. The operation, mounted mostly
in Chekiang Province, reached the railroad objectives and took airfields at
Yushan, Chuhsien, and Lishui by the end of August. The Japanese withdrew to
conserve strength in the face of fighting in the Solomons and New Guinea.
Renewed Japanese advances began again in February 1943, this time to capture
Yangtse River shipping that they could use to alleviate shortages of water
transport elsewhere. During both campaigns, Chennault’ s men fought with
interdiction and counterair missions whenever the air transport pilots hauled in
enough gasoline and spare parts to support flying. At the end of May 1943, the
Japanese once again withdrew to more defensible positions. In both the 1942
and 1943 efforts, the Japanese did not intend to hold all the territory they took.
China was far too vast for the Japanese Army Air Force to offer a stiff defense
everywhere. Chennault’s men, then, had the advantage of being able to pick the
place of attack:l Selecting the points of attack depended, in turn, on the
employment of a widespread intelligence network and first-rate analysis and
interpretation. In Chennault’s eyes, better use of air intelligence would come
with a separate Army Air Force in China.
In the spring of 1943, Chennault heard that his operation was to be a
separate command. He would become amajor general, no longer under Bissell’ s
control. In July 1943, when Washington split the CBI Theater into the distinct
sectors of India-Burma and China, much of the reason for doing so resided in
satisfying Chiang’s insistence on independence for Chennault. When Bissell
returned to Washington, Strateineyer became the India-Burma air commander,
with advisory authority over Chennault’s operations, but he had no real power
to directly influence the Fourteenth Air Chennault now began to make
increasing use of the growing interservice intelligence capability in China, a
capability that ultimately benefited both the AAF and the Navy.
Chennault had long sought to strike enemy shipping and had in fact done
so since 1942, but his small air force had been hampered by constant supply
problems. The Fourteenth was so hard pressed for fuel, tires, spare engines, and
parts that its squadrons could not fly patrols seeking randomly located ships in
the open waters off China. Search techniques for finding random targets in a
given region of the ocean had been developed by the Allies in Atlantic
operations and were ideal for use in China. To make the best use of available
aircraft, the Fourteenth’s B-24 and B-25 patrol bombers needed to be directed
to an area where the probability of success was reasonably high. The tactics
were well understood, but success required sophisticated, methodical imylemen-
tation, something Chennault had been unable to afford on a large scale. The
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