Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
many means to obtain this information, he went on, “With us the simple
methods, such as observation from the air [emphasis added] and ground and the
exploitation of prisoners and documents, have proved more effective than the
less direct means.”15
For ground commanders, the World War I experience contributed to a
perspective that defined air intelligence largely as the use of aircraft to collect
information usable by ground commanders. This stemmed from the fact that
most of the activity of Air Service units (which were in combat only seven
months) was directly tied to ground operations, either in observation or artillery
spotting or in direct combat support through strafing and bombing of enemy
positions. World War I, including the limited Air Service AEF experience,
showed that aviation had more than one role and therefore required more than
one form of air intelligence.
The report of the Chief of G-2-A-7 (Office of Air Intelligence) at GHQ
AEF illustrated clearly that most of the work done by his office involved
information not immediately related to either observation or direct support.
Rather, it dealt with the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information
necessary to conduct air operations apart from support. The Air Order of Battle
Section obtained and kept current information on “enemy air and balloon units,
enemy airdromes, and the organization of the enemy’s Air Service” for
inclusion in the daily Summary of Air Information. Recognizing the effects that
individual leaders can have on an air unit, G-2-A-7 kept a file on “prominent
German airmen . . . with a view to determining what might be expected of any
new unit to which these flyers were assigned . . . and to determine which
German air units were the most prominent. . . .” Each month the G-2-A-7 office
distributed a map and list of airdromes showing the location, size in hangars,
sheds, estimated capacity, and units present. Much of this information came
from photographs, and reports always distinguished between visual reportage
and photographic confirmation. Changes in enemy dispositions were relayed in
the daily Summary of Air Information.16
The Enemy Activity Section concentrated on air rather than on ground
forces. The office sought to determine where the enemy was most active
(seeking thereby to ascertain his intentions), to monitor developments in enemy
tactics, and to understand the German system of training as a means of
evaluating strengths and weaknesses. Information came from observers at
antiaircraft (AA) batteries, postmission interviews (in modem terminology,
debriefings), prisoners, and captured documents. The report referred, for
example, to “two captured German documents, showing how pursuit and battle
planes were to operate over the lines, [which] proved to be of great value to
Allied airmen.” Officers from G-2-A-7 met weekly with Allied counterparts to
exchange information.”
Even less immediately related to the support of ground forces were the
duties of the Bomb Target Section. Although the war ended before plans for
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