Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
General Staff. Moreover, he continued, there was no need to address an attack
on Hawaii because, having been studied for twenty years, “it was so obvio~s.”~
In contrast, Col. Rufus Bratton, Chief, Far East Section, MID, recalled they had
not included a possible Japanese attack on Hawaii because they believed the
Navy to be on the alert, and “we therefore relegated such an attack to the realm
of remote possibility.”’ While MID apparently considered the possibility of a
covering raid somewhere in the Pacific, it saw this as the Navy’s concern,
despite the fact the Army’s purpose for being in Hawaii was to defend the
islands and the fleet.’
MID estimates on the Far East in the year leading up to the attack focused
almost exclusively on possible Japanese moves into Southeast Asia and the
Netherlands East Indies (NEI). Even an ON1 report that the Japanese had
apparently created a new task force did not influence this emphasis. Only in the
estimate of January 1941-eleven months before the attack-was there a
reference to the possibility of “raids and surprise attacks against Pacific ports
on the mainland as well as against Alaska.”” Naval officials were no more
perceptive. No ON1 estimate addressed the Japanese capability of air attack
against Pearl Harbor.” In the Navy Department’s November 27th message, the
impact of the arresting first sentence was lessened by the explicit assessment
that “the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
naval task forces indicates [sic] an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines [,I Thai or Kra Peninsula [sic] or possibly Borneo.” While
“Continental districts [,] Guam [,] Samoa [are] directed [to] take appropriate
measures against sabotage,” Oahu was not even mentioned.”
In the months before December 1941, American intelligence officers and
their superiors focused on what they saw as Japanese intentions at the expense
of understanding their ~apabi1ities.l~ Intelligence officers fell into the trap of
assessing Japan’s intentions within the framework of American logic and
interpretation of what the Japanese should do, rather than what the Japanese
might think they should do. This tendency to discount Japanese decision making
was to return to dog American air commanders at other times, but not with such
catastrophic results as it did in December 1941.
As General Miles admitted, “We underestimated Japanese military power.”
According to Miles, authorities had evaluated the opponent on his “past record,”
which they believed was “not impre~sive.”’~ The difficulty of obtaining accurate
intelligence made assessment difficult, but evidence of Japan’s strengths as well
as weaknesses was available. By overlooking or ignoring this evidence,
authorities assumed a level of capability that encouraged an incorrect assessment
of intentions. Admiral Kimmel spoke for many when he admitted off the
record, “I never thought those little sons-of-bitches could pull off such an
attack, so far from Japan.”Is
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