Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
perspective of where they reached the coast as they turned east from the North
Sea toward the continent, these maps significantly reduced the tendency to stray
far from the intended route due to weather, enemy action, or simply inexperi-
ence in navigation. As German defenses became more complex in response to
the bombing campaign, Eighth's A-2 worked closely with other agencies,
including the British War Office's Anti-Aircraft Artillery Department, to
produce flak maps.* These maps provided the known locations of AA artillery
batteries, searchlights, balloons, smoke screens, decoys, and search and control
radars. O0
So valuable were these products, especially the perspective target and
landfall identification maps, that General Arnold not only congratulated the
Eighth, but asked Eaker's opinion on the feasibility of London or Washington's
preparing similar maps for other theaters, where units could then impose the
most current local data. A draft response prepared for the commanding general
suggested theater differences were such that it was neither feasible nor desirable
to undertake such a project. It was, in fact, never done, but airmen elsewhere
made similar devices, particularly in the CBI region."'
Another critical area in which differences in American and British
operational procedures directly affected intelligence requirements lay in the
realm of target development and analysis of specific target data. Here also the
contrasting strategies of night area bombing and daylight precision bombing
necessitated the development of American air intelligence and planning
capabilities oriented differently from those of the British. Because the British
emphasized night bombing of large industrial and urban areas as the means to
force a general collapse of the German economy and morale, the extensive
information compiled by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) and
Air Ministry Air Intelligence tended to address the enemy's economic and
industrial capabilities from a perspective devoid of technical detail."*
In contrast, American daylight precision bombing depended upon a
determination of the critical systems within the enemy's industrial and military
structure, evaluation of specific targets within these broad categories, and the
ability to destroy these precise targets most effectively and efficiently. This
required detailed information and analyses not only pinpointing the critical
targets within broad industries but also addressing the vulnerabilities of specific
targets such that operational planners could focus on the most critical elements
of any given target.lo3
After the December 1942 shift of Colonel Hughes and his target branch, the
Eighth's Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, A-5, became a critical link between
intelligence and operations with primary responsibility for coordinating target
matters and operational planning with the British as well as within the Eighth
*A separate air intelligence specialty, flak intelligence, dealt with mapping and
studying the layout of AA defenses.
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