Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

CHAPTER 6
Taking the Offensive: From
China-Burma-India to the
B-29 Campaign
AS WAS THE CASE IN THE SWPA, intelligence gathering and interpreta-
tion played a large role in turning the tide against the Japanese in the POA and
in the Far East. In the CBI Theater and in the Central Pacific Area, intelligence
was crucial to successful Allied air operations. Although intelligence contrib-
uted to target planning in the B-29 strategic air campaign against Japan,
intelligence was lacking in regard to the location of specific industry in the
home islands. With the switch to low-level, night incendiary attacks, detailed
intelligence gathering became much less crucial.
In the CBI Theater, the AAF’s operations came to be divided initially
between the Tenth Air Force’s China Air Task Force (CATF) and the India Air
Task Force (IATF). In time, the CATF became the Fourteenth Air Force under
Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault. The IATF and its parent Tenth became part of
the region’s very complex Anglo-American command structure. These two air
forces operated at the end of the longest logistics line of the war. Together the
Tenth and the Fourteenth comprised the bulk of the American commitment to
the theater, yet they remained small when compared to the AAF combat
commands in Europe. As the two air forces and men struggled to improvise
flying operations, their intelligence gathering and application struggled also,
adapting innovative and unique practices. In fact, unusual methods of gathering
and using intelligence were to become hallmarks of the AAF in the CBI region.
In China, the application of tactical air power could be effective in that vast
land only if valid target information was available. Some of that information,
and damage assessment as well, came from special teams sent to infiltrate
Japanese-held territory and report by radio on enemy activity. More sophisti-
cated intelligence gathering later came to be used in China and Burma as AAF
ferret aircraft scouted and mapped Japanese radar stations, giving the aircraft
crews the opportunity to escape or minimize the damage incurred after
interception or from AA fire. By August 1945, the AAF’s commanders had
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