Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Tools of Air Intelligence
interrogations and such photointelligence as became available. As the official
histories for these activities make clear, these sources did not produce sufficient
intelligence by themselves. Coast watching was hampered because combat
intelligence staffs distrusted, as one war history put it, the “cloak and dagger”
type of agent, which produced reluctant coordination, while a dearth of qualified
linguists hampered the interpreters.”’ Photographic and visual aerial intelligence
depended upon good weather (notably hard to find in some parts of the
SWPA) and having aircraft in the right place at the right time. If MacArthur and
his subordinates were to rely upon intelligence sources for operational planning,
much of it would have to be from radio intercepts and traffic analysis. At
approximately the same time as Kenney prepared his Allied Air Force for a
campaign against the Japanese, the SIGINT Service at Arlington Hall and the
B Section of MIS began to break the Japanese military codes. McCormack’s
desire to integrate all signals-derived intelligence entailed closer coordination
with all field interception operations and the passage of SIGINT data through
a special and highly secure, centrally controlled system of SSOs.
It also meant establishment of policy. As General Marshall stated to
General MacArthur in a letter of May 1943, “a uniform policy . . . with respect
to the handling and use of Japanese ULTRA in theaters of operation” is
necessary. Apparently, MacArthur interpreted this as Washington’s interfering
in the SWPA SIGINT operation. The SWPA commander balked and did not
answer his superior for two months. At issue was B Section’s insistence upon
direct communications between Washington and their SSOs. What McCormack
wanted in the SWPA was an arrangement similar to that already in place in
Europe for the handling of ULTRA. MacArthur saw this as an unwarranted
intrusion and told Washington that it was “a violation of all sound military
organization. . . . If this view [that the theater commander must retain control
of all forces in his theater] is not accepted,” he announced, ‘‘I would prefer not
having the organization proposed established in this theater.” It took a personal
visit by Colonel McCormack’s assistant two months later to convince the
SWPA commander otherwise; even then MacArthur insisted that SSOs “be
under my control for administration and dis~ipline.”~~ MacArthur’s attitude
long influenced his use of Washington-derived SIGINT.
The SWPA commander, and some of his senior staff, continued to view the
SSOs from Washington with great suspicion throughout the war. MacArthur
directed that Willoughby exclude them from the CB, and his G-2 consciously
snubbed them.210 It is tempting to conclude that MacArthur’s apparent dismissal
of SIGINT from Washington lay in his egotism. It was more likely based on his
perception that he was already well served by his own SIGINT, and additional
material would not be worth the price of interference that might come with it.
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