Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

82. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
p. 45.
83. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 169.
84. Annual Rprt, WD, Report of the
Secretary of War to the President, 1938
(Washington, D.C., 1938), pp. 29-30.
85. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
p. 46.
86. Maj Gen Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence
at the Top: The Recollections of
An Intelligence OfJicer (Garden City,
N.Y., 1969), pp. 23-24.
87. Uri Bider, The Shadow of the Bomber:
The Fear of Air Attack and British
Politics, 1932-1939 (London, 1980), pp.
55-56,127-160.
88. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 169.
89. Williamson Murray, Strategy for
Defeat: The Lufhvaffe, 1933-1945 (Baltimore,
Md., 1985), pp. 18-23.
90. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
pp. 4849.
91. Ibid., pp. 49, 51.
92. kct, Capt Robert C. Oliver, ACTS,
“Military Intelligence MI-l-C,” Apr 3,
1939,248.5008-1,1938-1939.
93. Ibid.; handwritten lect, Oliver,
ACTS, Apr 29, 1939, 248.5008-13,
1938-1939. The Army Command and
General Staff School was currently emphasizing
a preference of intelligence
“capabilities” over “intentions,” and the
matter would be included in the Army
Staff Officer’s Field Manual dated Aug
19, 1940. See Bidwell, History of MID, p.
512.
94. Oliver handwritten lect, Apr 29,
1939; ACTS, “Military Intelligence Required
for Initial Operations of Air Units,”
n.d., 248.501-25, 1938-1 939.
95. Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,’’
chap 7, p. 8.
96. OCAC, Personnel Order 192, Aug
17, 1939.
97. “Report of a Board of Officers
Convened by the Chief of the Air Corps to
Consider Air Corps Requirements for
Military Intelligence,” n.d., 142.0201-1,
1939.
98. Memo, Brig Gen George V. Strong,
AC/S WPD, for CAC, subj: Air Corps
Intelligence, Oct 5, 1939, 142.0201-1,
1939.
Notes to Pages 37-47
99. Bidwell, History of MID, p. 386.
100. Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,”
chap 7, pp. 16-17.
101. Bidwell, History of MID, p. 305.
102. Memo, Maj Gen H. H. Amold,
CAC, for Chief, Info Sec OCAC, subj:
Evaluation of Foreign Information for Air
Corps Command and Staff Use, Oct 23,
1940,145.9340, Sep 1940-Mar 1941.
103. OCAC, “Organization of Intelligence
Division,” Dec 1940, 142.021;
Hansell, Strategic Air War Against Germany
and Japan, p. 23.
104. Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,”
chap 7, pp. 29-32.
105. Ibid.
106. Hansell, Strategic Air WarAgainst
Gennany and Japan, p. 21,
107. Ibid., pp. 20-21; Hansell intvw,
Jan 21,1987.
108. Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,”
chap 7, pp. 32-36.
109. Ibid., pp. 4446.
110. Ibid., pp. 40-42.
11 1. “List of Air Corps Attachts and
Military Missions,” ca. Jan 1942,
142.0201-2, OCt 1939-Jan 1942.
1 12. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
p. 53.
113. Bidwell, History of MID, p. 386.
114. Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,”
chap 7, pp. 4142.
115. Ibid., pp. 4546; memo, Brig Gen
M. F. Scanlon, ACIAS, Intelligence (A-
2), for UAS, subj: Responsibility for Air
Intelligence, Sep 8, 1941, 145.91-221,
Jun 1941.
116. Bidwell, History of MID, p. 306;
Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,” chap
7, pp. 48-52.
117. Cohen, “History of Air Intelligence,”
chap 7, pp. 52-53.
118. Ibid.
1 19. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
p. 59.
120. Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, CPlans Div,
OCAC, and Col R. C. Candee, C/Intel
Div, OCAC, “An Air Estimate of the
Situation,” Mar 22, 1941, 142.0302-10.
121. Bidwell, History ofMID, pp. 386-
387. In the main, these individuals were
not held in high regard by Brig Gen Ray-
mond E. Lee, U.S. Army Military Attach6
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