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Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

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Notes to Pages 381-388<br />

(New York, 1962). pp. xi-xiii; Diaries of<br />

Henry L. Stimson, 50 and 51 (microfilm<br />

ed, reel 9) (hereafter Stimson Diaries),<br />

entries for Mar 5, Apr 24,25, and May 28,<br />

1945, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale<br />

University Library, New Haven, Conn.;<br />

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy,<br />

On Active Service in Peace and War (New<br />

York, 1948), p. 613.<br />

64. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.<br />

266-267; Records of <strong>the</strong> Manhattan Engineer<br />

District (hereafter MED Records),<br />

NA, RG 77, Microfilm Roll M1109, folder<br />

5, sec D, “Report of <strong>the</strong> Target Committee<br />

Meeting, Apr 27, 1945”; Stimson<br />

and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 613.<br />

65. R&R C/S 20th AF (Norstad) to Dir<br />

JTG, subj: Target Information, Apr 27,<br />

1945, and “Report of Target Committee,”<br />

Apr 27, 1945, both in MED Records.<br />

66. R&R CIS 20th AF (Norstad) to Dir<br />

JTG, subj: Target Information, Apr 27,<br />

1945, and “Report of Target Committee,”<br />

Apr 27, 1945, both in MED Records.<br />

67. Memos, Maj Deny and Dr. N. F.<br />

Ramsey to Groves, subj: Summary of<br />

Target Committee Meetings of 10 and 11<br />

May, May 12, 1945, and Col John N.<br />

Stone to Arnold, subj: Groves Project, Jul<br />

24, 1945 (<strong>the</strong> Stone memo gave Arnold<br />

<strong>the</strong> specific reasons why <strong>the</strong> cities had<br />

been chosen, except for Kyoto, which had<br />

by <strong>the</strong>n been stricken from all lists by<br />

Stimson), both in MED Records.<br />

68. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, chap<br />

19, “Choosing <strong>the</strong> Target”; see also planning<br />

meeting records of <strong>the</strong> Target Committee<br />

for <strong>the</strong> general course of <strong>the</strong><br />

509th’~ position; intvw, Arthur K. Marmor<br />

with Brig Gen Paul W. Tibbets, Jr.,<br />

Sep 1966, K239.0512-602, pp. 17-22.<br />

69. Tibbets intvw, Sep 1966, pp. 17-22.<br />

70. Stimson Diaries, entries for May 1,<br />

2,28, 1945; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,<br />

p. 327.<br />

71. Stimson Diaries, entry for Jun 6,<br />

1945.<br />

72. Ibid., entry for Jun 19, 1945.<br />

73. Ibid., entries for Jun 6, 19, 26-30,<br />

1945.<br />

74. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s<br />

ULTRA: Codebreaking and <strong>the</strong> War<br />

Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence,<br />

460<br />

Kans., 1992), pp 202-223. Drea’s work is<br />

particularly useful in understanding Mac-<br />

Arthur’s policy and command decisions in<br />

<strong>the</strong> SWPA. It goes beyond <strong>the</strong> SWPA,<br />

however, to open new insights into Wash-<br />

ington’s decision to use atomic weapons,<br />

and it should not be overlooked by a<br />

reader interested in this subject.<br />

75. Minutes, JCS mtg with Truman, Jun<br />

18, 1945, NA, RG 165.<br />

76. Ronald R. Spector, Eagle Against<br />

<strong>the</strong> Sun (New York, 1985). p. 543.<br />

77. Stimson Diaries, entry for Jul 2,<br />

1945; SWPA SIB, Jul 15/16, 1945 (<strong>the</strong><br />

semimonthly review). For a review of <strong>the</strong><br />

literature (as of late 1990) relating to <strong>the</strong><br />

use of this weapon, see J. Samuel Walker,<br />

“The Decision to Use <strong>the</strong> Bomb: A Histor-<br />

iographical Update,” Diplomatic History,<br />

winter 1990, pp. 97-1 14.<br />

78. Stimson Diaries, entry for May 31,<br />

1945.<br />

79. Ltr, LeMay to Arnold, Jul25, 1945.<br />

80. Stimson Diaries, entries for Jun<br />

26-30, Jul 2; memo, Norstad to Arnold,<br />

subj: Notes for Conference with Secretary<br />

of War, Jan 2, 1945, AFHSO, Norstad<br />

Papers, microfilm reel 328 11, frame 477;<br />

Itr, Arnold to Lt Gen Barney M. Giles,<br />

C/AS, Feb 16, 1945, AFHSO, Norstad<br />

Papers, microfilm reel 3281 1. Arnold, in<br />

writing to Giles, spelled out as clearly as<br />

ever his position on why <strong>the</strong> B-29s had to<br />

produce results. Having built nearly 2,000,<br />

he could not explain satisfactorily why <strong>the</strong><br />

AAF could not put even 100 over a target.<br />

See also ltr, Arnold to Brig Gen William<br />

J. Donovan, OSS, Dec 30,1944, AFHSO,<br />

Norstad Papers, microfilm reel 3281 1,<br />

where Arnold noted that <strong>the</strong> B-29 opera-<br />

tions were carried out on <strong>the</strong> basis of<br />

information from <strong>the</strong> experience over<br />

Germany, not on accurate intelligence of<br />

Japan.<br />

81. Schaffer, Wings of Judgment, chap<br />

8. 82. Diary entry, Aug 11, 1945, LC,<br />

Spaatz Papers, box 21; “Interim Report of<br />

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey,” Jun 18,<br />

1945, LC, LeMay Papers, box 1 1. See also<br />

MacIsaac’s Strategic Bombing in World<br />

War I1 (pp. 99-102) for a discussion of<br />

<strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> USSBS on <strong>the</strong> future

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