Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office
Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office
Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Notes to Pages 381-388<br />
(New York, 1962). pp. xi-xiii; Diaries of<br />
Henry L. Stimson, 50 and 51 (microfilm<br />
ed, reel 9) (hereafter Stimson Diaries),<br />
entries for Mar 5, Apr 24,25, and May 28,<br />
1945, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale<br />
University Library, New Haven, Conn.;<br />
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy,<br />
On Active Service in Peace and War (New<br />
York, 1948), p. 613.<br />
64. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp.<br />
266-267; Records of <strong>the</strong> Manhattan Engineer<br />
District (hereafter MED Records),<br />
NA, RG 77, Microfilm Roll M1109, folder<br />
5, sec D, “Report of <strong>the</strong> Target Committee<br />
Meeting, Apr 27, 1945”; Stimson<br />
and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 613.<br />
65. R&R C/S 20th AF (Norstad) to Dir<br />
JTG, subj: Target Information, Apr 27,<br />
1945, and “Report of Target Committee,”<br />
Apr 27, 1945, both in MED Records.<br />
66. R&R CIS 20th AF (Norstad) to Dir<br />
JTG, subj: Target Information, Apr 27,<br />
1945, and “Report of Target Committee,”<br />
Apr 27, 1945, both in MED Records.<br />
67. Memos, Maj Deny and Dr. N. F.<br />
Ramsey to Groves, subj: Summary of<br />
Target Committee Meetings of 10 and 11<br />
May, May 12, 1945, and Col John N.<br />
Stone to Arnold, subj: Groves Project, Jul<br />
24, 1945 (<strong>the</strong> Stone memo gave Arnold<br />
<strong>the</strong> specific reasons why <strong>the</strong> cities had<br />
been chosen, except for Kyoto, which had<br />
by <strong>the</strong>n been stricken from all lists by<br />
Stimson), both in MED Records.<br />
68. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, chap<br />
19, “Choosing <strong>the</strong> Target”; see also planning<br />
meeting records of <strong>the</strong> Target Committee<br />
for <strong>the</strong> general course of <strong>the</strong><br />
509th’~ position; intvw, Arthur K. Marmor<br />
with Brig Gen Paul W. Tibbets, Jr.,<br />
Sep 1966, K239.0512-602, pp. 17-22.<br />
69. Tibbets intvw, Sep 1966, pp. 17-22.<br />
70. Stimson Diaries, entries for May 1,<br />
2,28, 1945; Groves, Now It Can Be Told,<br />
p. 327.<br />
71. Stimson Diaries, entry for Jun 6,<br />
1945.<br />
72. Ibid., entry for Jun 19, 1945.<br />
73. Ibid., entries for Jun 6, 19, 26-30,<br />
1945.<br />
74. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s<br />
ULTRA: Codebreaking and <strong>the</strong> War<br />
Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence,<br />
460<br />
Kans., 1992), pp 202-223. Drea’s work is<br />
particularly useful in understanding Mac-<br />
Arthur’s policy and command decisions in<br />
<strong>the</strong> SWPA. It goes beyond <strong>the</strong> SWPA,<br />
however, to open new insights into Wash-<br />
ington’s decision to use atomic weapons,<br />
and it should not be overlooked by a<br />
reader interested in this subject.<br />
75. Minutes, JCS mtg with Truman, Jun<br />
18, 1945, NA, RG 165.<br />
76. Ronald R. Spector, Eagle Against<br />
<strong>the</strong> Sun (New York, 1985). p. 543.<br />
77. Stimson Diaries, entry for Jul 2,<br />
1945; SWPA SIB, Jul 15/16, 1945 (<strong>the</strong><br />
semimonthly review). For a review of <strong>the</strong><br />
literature (as of late 1990) relating to <strong>the</strong><br />
use of this weapon, see J. Samuel Walker,<br />
“The Decision to Use <strong>the</strong> Bomb: A Histor-<br />
iographical Update,” Diplomatic History,<br />
winter 1990, pp. 97-1 14.<br />
78. Stimson Diaries, entry for May 31,<br />
1945.<br />
79. Ltr, LeMay to Arnold, Jul25, 1945.<br />
80. Stimson Diaries, entries for Jun<br />
26-30, Jul 2; memo, Norstad to Arnold,<br />
subj: Notes for Conference with Secretary<br />
of War, Jan 2, 1945, AFHSO, Norstad<br />
Papers, microfilm reel 328 11, frame 477;<br />
Itr, Arnold to Lt Gen Barney M. Giles,<br />
C/AS, Feb 16, 1945, AFHSO, Norstad<br />
Papers, microfilm reel 3281 1. Arnold, in<br />
writing to Giles, spelled out as clearly as<br />
ever his position on why <strong>the</strong> B-29s had to<br />
produce results. Having built nearly 2,000,<br />
he could not explain satisfactorily why <strong>the</strong><br />
AAF could not put even 100 over a target.<br />
See also ltr, Arnold to Brig Gen William<br />
J. Donovan, OSS, Dec 30,1944, AFHSO,<br />
Norstad Papers, microfilm reel 3281 1,<br />
where Arnold noted that <strong>the</strong> B-29 opera-<br />
tions were carried out on <strong>the</strong> basis of<br />
information from <strong>the</strong> experience over<br />
Germany, not on accurate intelligence of<br />
Japan.<br />
81. Schaffer, Wings of Judgment, chap<br />
8. 82. Diary entry, Aug 11, 1945, LC,<br />
Spaatz Papers, box 21; “Interim Report of<br />
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey,” Jun 18,<br />
1945, LC, LeMay Papers, box 1 1. See also<br />
MacIsaac’s Strategic Bombing in World<br />
War I1 (pp. 99-102) for a discussion of<br />
<strong>the</strong> influence of <strong>the</strong> USSBS on <strong>the</strong> future