Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
realized the war would not end in 1944, came too late to have any practical
effect.
The Allied landing on the coast of France had opened a new phase in the air
war in northwest Europe. Despite concerns regarding the capability of the
Lufiufle, preinvasion identification of airfields and monitoring of enemy air
movements nullified this threat. By summer, the GAF presence facing the
western Allies was greatly diminished; much of the GAF was committed to the
air defense of the Reich or to operations on the eastern front. Allied tactical air
forces could concentrate on interdiction and close air support virtually
unopposed in the air.
For air intelligence, what was perhaps most significant about the European
theater was that there were several distinct air wars being waged there. Initially,
these consisted of a tactical one in the Mediterranean and a strategic one from
the United Kingdom. With the implementation of Operation OVERLORD, and
especially after the breakout in July 1944, there developed yet a third air war.
This was also an air-to-ground war, but one that called for support of fastmoving
armored units in contrast to the grinding push up the Italian peninsula.
The importance of these distinctions is that the intelligence requirements and,
therefore, the intelligence organizations differed significantly. The range of
demands made on air intelligence directly paralleled the types and complexity
of operations the several air forces were called upon to execute. The sources
upon which intelligence drew varied as well. The last two years of the war
witnessed a maturation of intelligence analysis and application in a process
initiated before the summer of 1943, which matched the evolution of the
command structures. The most noticeable change in American air intelligence
in this period was the incorporation of Americans into the ULTRA system.
Coincidental with this was the growing role of ULTRA in overall air intelligence.
With or without ULTRA, successful air intelligence depended upon the fusion
of the full array of potential sources.
Mediterranean Theater: 1943-1945
For a year after the victory in North Africa, air operations in the Mediterranean
theater and the demands made on air intelligence remained significantly
different from those in the United Kingdom. During most of the first two years
of USAAF operations, American airmen in England focused almost solely on
strategic air operations without having to concern themselves with tactical
support for land forces. In contrast, from the beginning of Operation TORCH,
support for ground operations remained the principal function of Allied air
forces in the Mediterranean.
When the Allied high command decided to invade Sicily (Operation
HUSKY, begun July 9, 1943), Allied air forces, especially the NASAF, were
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