Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Retrospection
conundrum should not be surprising. Intelligence could estimate German
production on the basis of ULTRA and other sources, but correlation seemed
lacking between losses claimed in air-to-air action and the subsequent reports
of front-line strength, attrition, and production?’
By the end of 1943 the Allies were on the way toward winning the
intelligence war. Through a variety of sources, they built a coherent and
generally clear picture of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. In the
Mediterranean, Allied airmen used that intelligence to win a series of major
victories over Axis forces. In the skies over Germany, that advantage did not
translate into victory because the targets were too numerous and the bombers
too few, and because the Luftwufle’s fighter forces were fighting on their home
ground. The attacking bombers still had to deal with the defenders before hitting
the targets on which the American precision bombing campaign rested. All the
intelligence in the world could not change the fundamental equation of fighter
versus bomber.
Indeed, the attack on Schweinfurt in October 1943, the infamous “black
Thursday” raid, represented the nadir of the American strategic bombing effort.
It came close to ending the daylight campaign, and the damage to the morale of
Eighth Air Force was nearly catastrophic. But two improvements in late 1943
changed the balance in the air and gave American airmen the means to execute
their plans and make full use of the extraordinary advantages that intelligence
would give them in 1944. The first was the steady growth of the bomber force,
despite heavy losses, in the period from summer 1943 through summer 1944.
While Eaker had at his disposal a daily average of 459 bombers in June 1943,
by December the Eighth had more than 1,057 on hand, and by June 1944 the
total reached 2,547.@ The American bomber force could absorb far heavier
losses, while attacking progressively larger target sets on a more sustained
basis. Finally, a true long-range fighter, the P-51, appeared in the European
theater. Long- range fighter escort support now allowed the Americans to attack
the Lufcwafle anywhere in the skies over the Reich. Although appearance of the
P-51 did not lead to any significant decrease in bomber losses until May 1944,
it drastically increased the price that the Luftwafle had to pay,41 eventually
resulting in the German fighter force’s collapse prior to D-day.
Intelligence was particularly helpful in discerning how Allied changes in
tactics affected German defensive capabilities. Doolittle’s decision in March
1944 to release escorting fighters from the restrictions of flying close escort
missions with the bombers and to allow them to seek out German fighters
anywhere and everywhere received considerable support from intelligence.
ULTRA messages confirmed that American fighters were causing the Germans
difficulties as they attacked airfields and aircraft landing and taking of!2
ULTRA confirmed that the American air offensive was also causing desperate
shortages of pilots, parts, and supplies in the enemy fighter f0rces.4~
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