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Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

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CHAPTER 1<br />

Early Intelligence Organization in <strong>the</strong><br />

Army <strong>Air</strong> Corps<br />

INSTITUTIONALIZING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE in <strong>the</strong> United States<br />

began only in <strong>the</strong> last years of <strong>the</strong> nineteenth century, and air intelligence has<br />

been a distinctly twentieth-century phenomenon. The evolution of American air<br />

intelligence-in <strong>the</strong> decades preceding World War I1 was marked by contention.<br />

Compounding <strong>the</strong> problems of establishing and <strong>the</strong>n of implementing <strong>the</strong> new<br />

air intelligence organizations and functions was <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong>se<br />

issues of air intelligence and <strong>the</strong> broader questions of <strong>the</strong> role and position of<br />

<strong>the</strong> American air forces.<br />

An air force intended primarily to provide direct support to ground forces<br />

would require intelligence different from that required by an air force that had<br />

expanded, “independent” missions. Determining <strong>the</strong> most effective organization<br />

for <strong>the</strong> collection, evaluation, and dissemination of air intelligence depended on<br />

both <strong>the</strong> purpose of <strong>the</strong> air arm and its position within <strong>the</strong> military establish-<br />

ment. Given <strong>the</strong> lack of consensus throughout this period on ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> role or<br />

<strong>the</strong> position of American air forces, <strong>the</strong> Army’s uncertainty regarding air<br />

intelligence was inevitable.<br />

As late as one month before its entry into World War I, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army<br />

lacked any form of air intelligence organization. In <strong>the</strong> course of that war, <strong>the</strong><br />

development of <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army’s <strong>Air</strong> Service spawned several organizations,<br />

both in Washington and with <strong>the</strong> American Expeditionary <strong>Force</strong> (AEF) in<br />

France, concerned with air intelligence or air information, as it was variously<br />

called. Despite <strong>the</strong> broad application of air power during that conflict, most<br />

American Army officers came away convinced <strong>the</strong> <strong>Air</strong> Service would remain<br />

subordinate to <strong>the</strong> dominant ground forces. To <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>the</strong>y thought about it,<br />

air intelligence (by whatever title) involved primarily <strong>the</strong> use of airplanes and<br />

balloons to obtain information regarding enemy military forces to support an<br />

Army commander’s decisions. At times, it also included <strong>the</strong> collection and<br />

evaluation of information regarding <strong>the</strong> air forces of real or potential enemies:<br />

on this information British, French, and, later, American flyers planned <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

earliest counterair missions in attacks on German airfields.<br />

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