Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
technical intelligence, published bulletins, maintained the Air Intelligence
Library, and operated the Air Room.31 Management studies of this division in
1942 and 1943 were often critical, noting that form was emphasized too much
over substance. Instead of innocuous briefings and glossy magazine-style
publications, the management surveys stressed the need for timely, decision-
oriented presentations to the commanding general and his senior staff and
bulletins to provide useful information to operational commands.32 Given
Arnold’s insatiable demands for information on every aspect of the AAF, it is
not surprising that significant improvements were made in the Air Room
presentations. To support air forces worldwide, MID eventually produced and
distributed the Air Force General Information Bulletin, disseminating technical
and tactical intelligence much as Stratemeyer had argued for in his memoran-
dum to Marshall.
The primary burden for providing operational intelligence to combat
commands resided with the Operational Intelligence Division. Under the
direction of Lt. Col. Malcolm Moss, the target information portion of this
division was charged to prepare air estimates for strategic planning, assemble
information relative to actual and potential objectives for air attack (especially
industrial and economic targets), and develop air objective folders and target
charts for operational use.*33 Despite initial efforts in the late 1930s and
analyses prepared in the development of AWPD-1, this office faced a
formidable task. An example is Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker’s final report as Com-
manding General, Eighth Air Force, when he reflected that, on arriving in the
United Kingdom in early 1942, “Almost no information regarding targets in
Germany, strength and disposition of G.A.F., etc. or target material, pictures,
maps, etc. was available in the United States. In effect, we had no intelligence
information and material about Germany and her occupied territ~ries.”~~
Accurate and detailed information regarding the Japanese Empire was even
sparser.
In Europe, rather than starting from scratch, American airmen agreed to rely
primarily on British intelligence resources and organizations. By tacit
agreement, Eighth Air Force, working through the British Air Ministry,
assumed primary responsibility for intelligence regarding Germany, while AAF
A-2 concentrated on other theaters, including the Mediterranean and Pacific.
*Air estimates were broad studies of the nature and vulnerabilities of economic
and industrial systems important to an enemy’s potential to sustain military
operations. Objective folders were compilations of factual data, including aerial
photographs and maps when available, on actual and potential industrial-military
targets within specific geographical areas. Folders were intended for use by
commanders and operations and intelligence officers for mission planning and air
crew briefings. Target charts, for use by individual bomber crews, showed specific
information regarding the exact location of enemy objectives and highlighted terrain
features and other landmarks to aid pilots and bombardiers in locating their targets.
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