Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Notes to Pages 48-61
to the United Kingdom. See The Raymond
E. Lee Papers, a 5-volume diary (Carlisle
Army Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.), for Jun 3,
1940, to Jan 23, 1941, and for Apr 8 to
Nov 29,1941, pp. 168,423, and 467468.
Lee’s assessments, however, were influ-
enced perhaps by his negative views on
the use of air power for strategic bombing;
e.g., see p. 459.
122. Hansell, StrategicAir WarAgainst
Germany and Japan, p. 24.
123. Ibid., pp. 2541; Futrell, Ideas,
Concepts, Doctrine, pp. 59-61.
124. Hansell, Strategic Air WarAgainst
Germany and Japan, pp. 25-41; Futrell,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, pp. 59-6 1.
125. Hansell, Strategic Air War Against
Germany and Japan, pp. 25-41; Futrell,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, pp. 59-61.
126. Research Paper, Col C. W. Strand,
Air War College, “Philosophy, Concepts
and Doctrine for Air Intelligence,” Jan
1952, USAF Collection, pp. 20-21.
127. Memo, Maj H. S. Hansell, for Gen
Arnold through Gen Chaney, subj: An Air
Estimate of the Situation for the Employ-
ment of the Air Striking Force in Europe
(ABC-I), Aug 11, 1941, 145.96-32,
1941-1942.
128. Hansell intvw, Jan 21, 1987.
129. Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 266-
1. Constance Babington-Smith, Air Spy:
The Story of Photo Intelligence in World
War I1 (New York, 1957), p. 1.
2. Ursula Powys-Lybbe, The Eye of
Intelligence (London, 1983), pp. 3245.
3. Diane T. Putney, ULTRA and the
Army Air Forces in World War I1 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1987), p. 80; Patrick Beas-
ley, “ULTRA and the Battle of the Atlantic:
The British View,” symposium presenta-
tion, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis,
Md., Oct 28, 1977, p.1; David Kahn,
Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelli-
gence in World War II (New York, 1978),
pp. 193-195,218-222.
430
273.
130. Rprt, Gen William (Billy) Mitchell
(for the Secy War), untitled, unpublished,
AFHRC, Gen Ennis Whitehead files.
13 1. Among those suggesting Japanese
involvement are Fred Goener in Search
forAmelia Earhart (New York, 1966) and
Paul Briand in Daughter in the Sky (New
York, 1960). A contrary view is presented
by Elliott R. Thorpe in East Wind Rain
(Boston, 1969).
132. Intvw, Donald M. Goldstein with
Cdr Chihaya Masataka, Feb 1987.
133. “Eleven-Nation Allied Military
Tribunal” (unpublished, 1946), National
Archives and Records Administration
(NA).
134. Hearings before the Joint Committee
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack (hereafter PHA), pt 27, pp.
58-65.
135. Ibid., pp. 89-91.
136. Bidwell, History ofMID, pp. 461-
462.
CHAPTER 2
137. PHA, pt 27, pp. 54-74.
138. bid., pp. 89-90.
139. Ibid., pp. 54-74.
140. Gordon W. Prange, Pearl Harbor:
The Verdict ofHistory (New York, 1986).
141. Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 168-
169.
4. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence
in the Second World War: Its Influence
on Strategy and Operations (London,
1981), VO~ 3, Pt 2, pp. 778-780,946.
5. Putney, ULTRA and the AAF, p. 76.
6. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, vol3, pt 2, p. 946.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp. 945-960. Appendix 30
contains the most up-to-date (as of 1988)
discussion of the relative contributions of
the Poles, French, and British in the crack-
ing of Enigma.
9. Putney, ULTRA and the AAF, p. 77.
10. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the