Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Early Intelligence Organization
in fighter squadrons over the number of bomber squadrons, as well as the
emphasis placed on AA artillery, offered evidence of the concern for defense
against aerial bombardment. Lee added that most of those principally concerned
with defense believed Great Britain would undergo a severe ordeal, with much
damage and many casualties, for two to six months, after which initial enemy
efforts toward paralyzing the country would have been successfully withstood,
and the military and air initiatives would begin to pass to Britain.68
British concern rightly focused upon the newly recreated German Air Force
(GAF). By the late 192Os, even though German pilots were secretly training in
the Soviet Union, the Germans were apprehensive of the air disarmament
enforced upon their country by the Versailles treaty and by the fact that they
were surrounded by other nations with air forces. When Adolf Hitler came to
power in Berlin, the Lu..u#e commenced a remarkable rebuilding effort. Quite
soon, fifteen modern factories were reportedly devoting all their time to
building aircraft, and eight factories were said to be concentrating on aircraft
engines. At a social dinner given in his honor by the Foreign Press Union on
May 2,1935, General of Aviators Herman Goering, Reich Minister of Aviation,
surprised the world with a supposedly frank report on Germany’s aviation
program. Goering said that Germany had had no aerial weapons at the time
Hitler took over the government; a completely new and modem air force had
been built almost overnight by developing “technical and industrial possibilities
to their utmost.” “I am not telling you anything surprising,” Goering said,
“when I emphasize that the German aerial forces are so strong that whoever
attacks Germany will have a very difficult stand in the air. For the German
fighting forces do not include a single old motor. What is possessed today by
the aerial fighting forces in the way of airplanes and motors is the most modern
product in existence.”69
During the crucial years of Hitler’s aggregation of power, then-Major
Truman Smith served as U.S. military attache in Berlin. One of his two
assistants was an Air Corps officer, Capt. Theodore Koenig. Koenig an able
pilot, but he lacked a technical and an intelligence background. On May 6,
1935, Koenig forwarded to Washington a report of Goering’s remarks with the
conclusion that the Minister’s statements were apparently correct. “It is not
believed, however,” Koenig continued, “that the air fighting force which he
referred to is now organized and equipped for immediate action but it is
believed that the organization and equipment is well underway and that upon
the completion of the construction of airdromes and necessary quarters and
hangars, the picture of the German air force as painted by General Goering will
be a reality. It is further believed that this force will be equal to that of
France.”70
In the autumn of 1935, Captain Koenig’s reports of information regarding
the GAF were prefaced with a caveat: “Events are changing very rapidly in
Germany and what may be considered good information today may be
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