Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
prevented from developing to its full potential. At no time during the war did
any OSS office, including that of the director, receive deciphered code (ULTRA)
material, except for a small amount from British sources. The full effects of the
disparate and for the most part uncoordinated intelligence efforts varied greatly.
Sometimes the services acted together, as in early 1944 when the U.S. Army,
Navy, and AAF, in conjunction with the Royal Air Force (RAF), divided
worldwide responsibilities for combined air intelligence. This division of labor
essentially recognized existing activities and, by reducing duplication of effort
and increasing the speed of work, partially solved a number of problems.
Although the respective services gained the intelligence tasks they most
preferred, the agreement did not address the core issue of central control of the
collective work, nor did it solve the interservice or organizational problems
faced by the air intelligence specialists in the various war theaters. Perhaps the
extraordinary pressures of total war, the personalities of the leaders involved,
and the conduct of certain sensitive activities-such as the highly secret
cryptanalytical projects of the Army, Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and Coast Guard-precluded any overarching, centrally controlled intelligence
organization.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, the need for adequate,
reliable information about the enemy became at times desperate. Between
December 1941 and May 1942, Japanese forces swept throughout Southeast
Asia and threatened Australia and New Zealand. Having occupied the continent
of Europe, German forces advanced on Moscow, while U-boats savaged Allied
shipping in the Atlantic. Allied leaders clamored for an immediate air offensive
against Germany. Responding to these conditions, the AAF’s wartime
intelligence effort, like the air arm itself, grew rapidly.
Early wartime conditions, to be sure, multiplied pressures on the young air
intelligence officers, most of whom had no previous experience in this arcane
business. They had to respond to demands for intelligence about combat
conditions in almost a dozen theaters of war. Responses to the demands for
intelligence in each region of conflict, as one might imagine, varied greatly. No
theater air force was the equivalent of any other in terms of its size, mission,
organization, personnel, fighting experience, or in its allocation of aircraft and
weapons. So no air intelligence office in any theater working for a major air
commander was quite like any other.
The Assistant Chief of Air Staff (AC/AS), Intelligence, or A-2, supervised
all of the field intelligence operations, though exercising no direct control over
units in the field. This office did have specific duties in support of General
Arnold, of the Twentieth Air Force, and of other Air Staff office^.^ For the field,
the A-2 provided such things as target folders, area studies, maps, and related
materials. The A-2 also coordinated the assignments of trained intelligence
specialists, directed the operation of stateside intelligence training programs,
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