Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
number of airfields and the lack of logistical support limited the number of
Allied aircraft in the forward combat area. Compounding this numerical
disadvantage was a command structure that, by fragmenting available air assets,
allowed the Lufhyuffe to maintain air superiority.
Operational and logistical planning for TORCH had been predicated on a
quick rush into Tunisia and an early end to the campaign. By November 28 the
drive into Tunisia had stalled, and Allied forces withdrew to Algeria to regroup.
Many factors contributed to the failure to take Tunisia. From an intelligence
perspective, certainly the most significant was the failure to foresee the extent
and rapidity of the GAF’s response. According to Lt. Gen. Kenneth Anderson,
commander of the British First Army which had spearheaded the move
eastward, it was the GAF that had been the decisive factor in bogging down the
advance.”’
Although they would attempt several abortive offensives in December, for
all practical purposes the Allied forces would spend from December 1942
through the end of January 1943 establishing the logistical infrastructure
necessary for sustained operations and implementing a series of reorganizations
that would eventually provide the framework for success in North Africa and
subsequently in western Europe. From these exertions came two milestones in
the history of air power: the development of organizational structures to permit
the effective employment of air assets within a theater as well as the more
specific control of air-ground operations, and an expanded role for air power,
particularly strategic air forces.
The evolution of Allied air organization in the Mediterranean theater was
a convoluted process that extended over a period of several months, and itself
the subject of many studies. During the execution of TORCH, Allied air forces
operated as two separate organizations with geographically determined
responsibilities: the British Eastern Air Command in eastern Algeria and the
American Twelfth Air Force in Morocco and in western Algiers. With the shift
of Twelfth Air Force eastward to support ground operations, this arrangement
became increasingly unwieldy. Through a series of gradual steps in the winter
of 1942-1943, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder emerged as the theater air commander
in charge of Mediterranean Air Command (MAC). Subordinate to MAC
were NAAF, Malta Air Force, and Eastern Air Command (Cairo). From the
standpoint of air operations in North Africa in 1942-1943, the pivotal step was
the creation of the NAAF under command of Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz in February
1943. Under this arrangement, the subordinate Northwest African Strategic Air
Force (NASAF), Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF), and
Northwest African Coastal Air Force (NACAF) focused on functional rather
than on geographically oriented missions.* Responsibility for the air defense of
*NATAF, composed of RAF 242 Group and U.S. XI1 Air Support Command,
was committed to the direct support of Allied land forces. NASAF, commanded by
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