Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
Compounding the problem was the fact that British Air Ministry Intelligence,
upon which Eighth Air Force and then USSTAF largely depended, still
could not always agree among its own divisions on how to interpret data that
came to them. While ULTRA provided reliable figures on unit strengths, the
Allies had no equally reliable method for comparing these figures with actual
or planned production. It was important to know the strength of the enemy, but
it was equally necessary to reduce that strength by a combination of attrition
and destruction of production facilities. The American position on this issue was
succinctly summarized by McDonald in a letter to HQ AAF in July 1944: “Our
only concern is to find out how much of the German Air Force is left to fight
and where we can bomb the production that sustains it.” Then, echoing similar
comments by Hughes, he expressed the opinion of USSTAF that “there is
actually more production than they [Air Ministry] have yet been able to find.”’”
What ULTRA did provide was extremely accurate data on unit strength, on
the German decision to reduce their bomber forces in favor of fighters, and on
the enemy’s efforts to strengthen their home air defenses at the expense of
Lufhvuffe operations in the Mediterranean region and in the USSR. By
November 1943, Allied intelligence counted some 1,700 single-engine fighters
confronting them in western Europe, including the German homeland.
Considering the August 1943 monthly production rate of 800, the Lufhvuffe
could replace itself every two months. By returning to the July production rate
of 1,050, it could lose fighters at October’s rate and still increase its force.Io3
This calculation reinforced the necessity to continue to attack production rather
than to simply seek attrition through aerial combat. The most forceful evidence
that the GAF would rebuild, given the opportunity, came not from SIGINT but
from HUMINT. In September 1943, the former Italian representative with the
German Ministry of Aircraft Production informed the Allies in great detail of
German efforts to increase fighter production. Through the implementation of
assembly lines, their goal was to go from the 500 fighters produced in January
1943 to 2,000 a month by late 1944 and to 3,000 monthly by April 1945.’04 In
light of the costs the GAF had imposed on the heavy bombers with a production
rate of 800-1,000 per month in 1943, such figures must have been truly
frightening.
In the last weekof 1943, McDonald’s intelligence staff in the newly formed
MAAF summarized Allied interpretations of the Lufhvuffe’s current status and
what Allied heavy bombers might face in the coming year. According to this
analysis, the air offensive against the German fighter industry had reached a
critical phase. The attacks in July, August, and October had, McDonald’s staff
believed, “seriously upset” German aircraft production. The difference between
the planned monthly output for November of 1,000 and the estimated actual
production of 650, or a total of some 1,500 fighters not produced over a fourmonth
period, demonstrated this. Equally significant, these attacks had
“thoroughly disrupted” the enemy’s intended program of expansion. Although
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