Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Notes to Pages 399-407
mated German economic and military
potential. One of the traditional views of
Americans is the belief that adaptability,
flexibility, and independence have much
to do with our success in war. That view
has been fundamentally undermined by
Martin van Creveld’s Fighting Power:
German and U.S. Army Peformance,
1939-1945 (Westport, Conn., 1982)
which indicates that the performance of
American ground units in World War I1
left much to be desired, especially in
comparison with the German Army. Nev-
ertheless, a point is worth making here:
American flexibility, adaptability, and
independence of mind made major contri-
butions in the support areas: logistics,
intelligence, and scientific and technologi-
cal development. In these areas the skills
of civilian life best translate into military
effectiveness.
10. For the best account of the Battle of
Britain, see Francis K. Mason, Battle Over
Britain (New York, 1968).
11. Haywood S. Hansell, The Air Plan
That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, 1972), pp.
53-54.
12. Craven and Cate, vol 1, Plans and
Early Operations, p. 149.
13. Ibid., p. 604.
14. Time, Dec 8, 1941, p. 15. As it does
today, Time appeared on the newsstands
before the date on the cover. This issue
was actually being sold as early as De-
cember 4.
15. Such attitudes suggest that the pres-
ent-day American ignorance of and con-
tempt for history represent a consistent
theme in our history. After all, had not the
Japanese Navy begun the Russo-Japanese
war with a surprise attack on Port Arthur,
an attack that was greeted with consider-
able approval by the American and British
press?
16. Bidwell, History of MID.
17. Eaker Final Rprt, Dec 31, 1943,
exhib 6, “Intelligence Development of
A-2 Section VIII Bomber Command,
Problems and Solutions.”
18. Memo, Lt Col Carl H. Norcross,
Asst A-2 VIII Bom Comd, for ACE,
subj: Army Air Forces Intelligence
462
School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Jan 22,
1943,266.1-1, 1942.
19. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the
Second World War, vol2, p. 46.
20. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
21. Ibid., p. 51.
22. Ibid.
23. In fairness to American airmen, no
matter how wrongheaded their analysis of
the operational arena might have been, it
is uncontestable that the daylight bomber
offensive was the crucial factor in winning
air superiority over the European continent
and that, without that air superiority,
OVERLORD would have faced nearly insurmountable
odds in driving the German
Army back from the coast of France. See
Murray, Lujiwaffe, chaps 56. 24. Fabyanic, “Critique of United States
Air War Planning,” pp. 125-127.
25. Webster and Frankland, vol 1, Preparation,
p. 177.
26. Ltr, Eaker to Spaatz, Oct 1942,
quoted in Fabyanic, “Critique of United
States Air War Planning,” pp. 129-130.
27. Craven and Cate, vol 2, TORCH to
POINTBLANK, pp. 670-672.
28. For an outstanding recent study on
the impact of ULTRA on the Mediterranean
campaign, see Ralph Bennett, ULTRA and
the Mediterranean (London, 1989).
29. For this side of the story, the reader’s
attention is drawn to Gordon Welchman’s
extraordinary book, The Hut Six
Story (New York, 1982).
30. Haines Report, p. 26. See also
Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, B.
H. Liddell Hart, ed (New York, 1953), pp.
266-268,282.
3 I. Ltr, Doolittle to CG AAF thru CG
NAAF, subj: Escort Fighters, 22.5.43. For
an interesting discussion of the development
of fighter escort for bomber formations
in the Mediterranean and the early
conclusion of Doolittle about the importance
of fighter escort, see Bernard Boylan,
“The Development of the Long-
Range Escort Fighter” (unpublished MS,
Maxwell AFB, 1955), AFHRA, pp. 74-
76.
32. See Albert Speer, Inside the Third
Reich (New York, 1970), p. 285.