Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
systems would make permanent damage difficult. “When these factors are
considered in combination,” it concluded, “the prospects of causing major
disruptions to submarine operations by aerial bombardment of bases would not
seem to be especially good, though some harassing action is no doubt possible
and effective within limits.”’40
Less than two weeks later, on the basis of a similar study of RAF operations
against submarine yards in 1941 and port-area attacks in 1942, Bomber
Operations, Air Ministry, concluded that even if successful, attacks on
construction facilities would take a minimum of nine months to affect the war
at sea because of the number of submarines already undergoing sea trials.
Expressing more hope than studied assessment, the Bomber Operations report
concluded, “It appears that by far the most profitable method of countering
submarines at the present is by harrying them at sea or attacking their operating
bases.”14’
By the end of November, after VIII Bomber Command had flown ten
missions against the Biscay targets, intelligence assessments remained mixed.
From the beginning, the Royal Navy had provided the thrust behind the
campaign. Thus, it was not surprising that an Admiralty Intelligence Board
report of November 20 referred to the “disorganization” that had resulted from
the eight attacks to that date, or that it concluded, “It seems probable that this
fine series of actions, if sustained, will have a considerable influence on the
enemy’s U-boat effort.”142 Several days later another naval intelligence report
reviewing the recent attacks on Lorient and Saint Nazaire, on November 22 and
23, respectively, concluded that they had been “important successes” and
predicted that “these ports will be completely dislocated in time provided that
the attacks can be kept up.”143
Airmen, both British and American, were less positive. In January, Lt. Col.
Harris B. Hull, still VIII Bomber Command A-2 and himself a veteran of
missions over the submarine pens, was in Washington telling the Air Staff and
the Joint Staff, “These g- d- submarine pens are killing us.’’lU The
obvious emphasis being placed on these five bases, in fact, had allowed the
Germans to concentrate dense and increasingly effective defenses. By the end
of 1942, VIII Bomber Command losses averaged about 8 percent per raid.’45
Based on photointerpretation reports and other sources (including ULTRA),
British air intelligence offered a much more guarded assessment than the Royal
Navy of the impact of the ten raids conducted between November 7 and 23.
Five attacks on Saint Nazaire had resulted in delays and shifts in repair work.
The facilities appeared to be at full capacity by December 9, and there had been
“no noticeable reduction” in the number of operating U-boats. Pointing out the
difficulties of permanently closing ports, as evidenced by German failures
against Malta and the RAF’s own problems against Bengazi, the report stated
such operations could have a significant impact only if the attacks were far
heavier and “sustained over a long period” and if the number of U-boats sunk
143