Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
attempting to create in the “scientific” objectivity of the strategic bombing
process.66 He was willing to accept recommendations with which he did not
fully agree in order to support the soundness of the selection method.
The inclusion of oil as a hedged priority target contingent on Ploesti raids
reflected the current assessment of the importance of oil (which was correct)
and the estimated critical levels of German reserves (which were still not nearly
so severe as the Allies thought). The Ploesti consideration was a reminder the
Allies were as yet incapable of seriously affecting the enemy’s oil industry from
bases in the United Kingdom. The recognition of Ploesti’s crucial position
within the German oil industry would prompt not only the spectacular raid by
American B-24s from North Africa in August 1943, but also what eventually
would almost amount to a campaign in itself against this complex, beginning in
late 1943.
One aspect of strategic air operations receiving unanimous agreement was
the need to destroy the GAF as quickly as possible. This operational goal and
others that followed greatly influenced the shape and the substance of air
intelligence. In their letter transmitting the Eaker Plan to the CCS, the JCS
noted, “If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly, it
may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned and thus
to create the conditions necessary for ultimate decisive action by our combined
forces on the C~ntinent.”~’ According to the American chiefs, intelligence
indicated that while German bomber strength over the past nine months had
declined from 1,760 to 1,450, fighters had increased from 1,690 to 1,7 10, in
spite of heavy losses in Russia and North Africa. Production over the past four
months had risen from 720 to 810 fighters per month, and the GAF had
increased its fighter strength by 44 percent since December 1941. At Casablanca,
Arnold’s background book had contained an intelligence assessment
that “no increase in I.E. [the effective unit] strength [of the GAF] is to be
expected.”68 Now, just four months later, the JCS noted that the enemy was
producing on average 108 fighters beyond his monthly losses. If this trend
continued, the Allies might face a total fighter force numbering 3,000 by spring
1944.
In addition to numerical growth, Allied intelligence had detected a
significant redisposition of the enemy fighter force. The number of fighters
opposing Allied bombers flying from England had doubled (from 420 to 830)
in the past 18 months. The impact, the Americans pointed out, was being felt
not just in the number of casualties taken by the daylight bomber force, but
“especially in terms of reduced tactical effectiveness.” The bombs simply were
not hitting the target often enough. While these figures were not entirely
accurate, they represented the parameters within which Allied leaders made
their decisions. Their overall significance was obvious enough for the
Combined Chiefs to declare, “German fighter strength must be considered as an
Intermediate objective second to none in prior it^."^^
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