Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
intelligence structure, something of a rival to the Navy’s unit in China that also
supported Chennault. AGFRTS, in addition to its OSS-peculiar duties aimed at
disrupting Japanese control, provided the airmen with weather reports and
information on lucrative targets such as ships and major Japanese troop
movements. Liaison teams serving with Chinese field army headquarters
reviewed, validated, and forwarded requests for air support and supplied
information upon which interdiction and close support missions could be
~lanned.~’
Of special importance during the Japanese offensive of 1944 were the
AGFRTS and Naval Group China agent reports that gave the location of
Japanese front lines and information on infiltration tactics and supply columns.
Using these reports, Brig. Gen. Clinton D. Vincent, commander of the 68th
Composite Wing, launched frequent attacks on the enemy columns nearing his
bases. Other reports allowed Vincent’s men to strike Japanese supply depots
and transshipment points. As if they were not busy enough, AGFRTS field
teams also assisted in the rescue and return of downed Allied airmen.50
In the spring of 1944, to support forward air operations, the Fourteenth Air
Force’s intelligence officer moved a section of his operation to Lianshan to
coordinate more rapidly with the field intelligence teams and to expedite
photointerpretation. As the Japanese pressed their offensive in the Tungting
Lake region, they forced evacuation of several Fourteenth Air Force bases.
Working with the 68th Composite Wing and the Fourteenth Air Force’s Air
Service Command, AGFRTS agents began systematic destruction of roads and
bridges as they reported Japanese positions and movements. Lacking coherent
information from the rapidly deteriorating Chinese Army, Vincent had to
depend on the field people and observations by his aircrews for warning and
information upon which to plan evacuation of Lingling and Hengyang airfields.
The Japanese advance had disrupted the ground situation, making it difficult for
AGFRTS teams to provide a constant flow of information. At the advanced
Fourteenth Air Force intelligence center, field team reports, photography,
Chinese military information, and other data were reviewed, sorted, and melded
into usable assessments of enemy movements and probable intentions. The
result was a speedy processing of information during the Japanese offensive that
allowed a series of interdiction strikes from early December 1944 through
March 1945. A bombardment of Hangkow’s docks and warehouses by Maj.
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay’s China-based B-29s supplemented the Fourteenth’s
attempts to deflect the Japanese dri~e.~’
By mid-November 1944, most of the major American air bases in eastern
China had fallen to the Japanese. Even before then, however, the Americans
began to make changes in the theater’s command and intelligence structure. In
October 1944, Chiang Kai-shek rid himself of a long festering sore when he
succeeded in getting President Roosevelt to recall Stilwell, replacing him with
Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. This was when the CBI Theater became the
320