Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
Force history credited the EOU with “the minutely detailed research into the
operation, design and construction of every individual target which the Eighth
Air Force decided to destroy by bombing.””’
The basis for these reports included the full range of MEW and BEW data
as well as Eighth Air Force operations research studies on bomb loading and
fuzing. The members of EOU eventually gained complete access as well to Air
Ministry operational intelligence, including ground reports and photointerpreta-
tion reports. The comment in the unit’s own history that one of its members had
to use “ineffable tact” in acquiring information from “the somewhat reluctant
Air Ministry Intelligence” suggests, however, that such openness did not come
immediately.”’ EOU personnel visited representative plants within the United
Kingdom, spoke with industrialists of appropriate industries, and attempted to
extrapolate lessons on target destruction from the results of earlier Luftwuffe
attacks.”’ The aiming-point reports provided an essential link between
intelligence and operations by offering a framework for organizing information
and a way to think about the precision bombardment of specific target^."^ More
specifically, the reports constituted much of the material that went into the
development of individual target folders, and they provided the information
upon which VIII Bomber Command selected not only precise aiming points for
bomb release, but also the types of bombs and fuzes for each target.’14
Feedback on the effects of an attack was as important as selecting the
proper target and the means by which to attack it. This broad issue of damage
assessment actually involved three related aspects: the extent of the physical
damage to the target, the effect of this destruction on that target’s output, and
the impact of this reduced production or repair capability on the total German
war effort. At the initiative of Colonel Hughes, now Eighth Air Force Assistant
Chief of Staff for Plans (A-5), one approach to this problem was the evolution
of yet another Anglo-American agency capable of supporting the intelligence
and analysis requirements of American bombing operation^."^
The British Ministry of Home Security had formed the Research and
Experiment (R.E.) Department in 1940 to reduce the effects of the Lufhyuffe’s
bombing on British industrial production by studying plant construction and
layout. In July 1942 a new section, R.E.8, had begun scientific analysis of the
vulnerability of German industrial targets and the impact of RAF Bomber
Command’s attacks. To meet the growing demands of an expanding war, in the
spring of 1943 R.E.8 became an Allied agency, with Americans incorporated
into it and EOU providing the link with Eighth Air Force and VIII Bomber
Command targeteers. By August 1943, fifteen Americans were assigned to
R.E.8.Il6 Relying primarily on aerial photography and interpretation, R.E.8
analyzed the number and distribution of bombs on the target; the damage to
structures, facilities, and production capabilities; the effectiveness of weapons
to determine suitability of specific bombs against particular types of targets; and
the probable recovery time and estimated production lost.’I7 EOU took this
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