Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Early Intelligence Organization
McNarney doubtless knew Air Corps viewpoints, but he represented the
WPD. The U.S. Army Air Corps as such had no representation at the American-
British Conversations. On March 22,1941, however, Colonel Candee (OCAC,
Intelligence) and Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz (OCAC, Plans) jointly signed an air
estimate of the situation. The two concluded:
While heavy air attacks on England will continue, there will be no serious
attempt at a land invasion. The Axis can strangle Britain-slowly,
methodically. Time is in favor of the Axis for the next year. It must be
expected that the Axis will obtain complete domination over Continental
Europe this summer, including the Balkans and possibly Turkey and Asia
Minor. . . . Britain must hold until aid from America can bring her air
forces to a parity with the Axis. Until then she cannot hope to take the
offensive. The war must be fought on a basis of attrition of items critical
to the Axis-oil, steel, and foodstuffs, of which we have a superiority.
Any active participation by the United States in the European war will
probably result in swift, aggressive action by the Japanese against the East
Indies and Malaya. If it becomes apparent that the U.S. will become an
active belligerent, the Axis powers will seek to have us commit our efforts
simultaneousIy in Europe and in the Far East. This is the worst situation
in which we could possibly place ourselves.””
In the aftermath of ABC-1, the U.S. War and Navy Departments estab-
lished closer relations with Great Britain. The Navy sent an observer group to
London under Rear Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, and on May 8,1941, Maj. Gen.
James E. Chaney, Air Corps, was ordered to England as a special army observer
to carry out secret instructions of the Secretary of War. His real mission was to
“work out joint plans of operation and, in the event of war, to assume command
functions for such forces as may be employed.” The secretary had authorized
for Chaney a complete general staff, including a G-2. Establishment of this
Special Observers Group in London raised the question of its relationship to
Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, the military attache to Great Britain. From
Washington, General Miles informed General Lee that he and the Special
Observers Group were mutually independent. Lee was under the supervision of
MID, but he was to provide the observers with copies of all his reports.’*’
The Candee-Spaatz estimate of the situation prepared on March 22, 1941,
had posed many intelligence questions relative to the work RAF intelligence
might have accomplished against Germany. It had recommended that one or
more U.S. Army Air Corps officers be attached to the RAF intelligence
directorate with free access to gather intelligence required for employment of
American air forces if the United States went to war. In the summer of 1941
Haywood Hansell, now a major, arrived in England and received a generous
welcome from RAF intelligence. In regard to air target materials, Hansell found
on balance that the AAF was better informed on German electric power,
petroleum, and synthetic product resources. The RAF knew more about German
aircraft and engine production, the GAF, and German transportation. By the end
of his visit he had acquired nearly a ton of documents, mostly classified target
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