Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
completed in Italy for use by the Fifteenth Air Force. ULTRA material drawn
from Japanese sources flowed from Washington to Europe on completion of the
Anglo-American intelligence-sharing agreement in mid-1943. The eastward
flow, however, was far less than the amount of similar material on Germany
derived by the British Government Code and Cypher School’s ULTRA operation
at BP.
The success of the air intelligence arrangement in the European-Mediterranean
region led the Anglo-American Allies to divide intelligence worldwide
along more formal lines. In February 1944, the RAF, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army’s
G-2, and AAF concluded an agreement giving the Americans primary
responsibility for air intelligence collection and analysis in support of the war
with Japan. Despite the intelligence rivalries, the Americans had come to realize
that dividing intelligence activities among the agencies best able to meet the
particular requirements of that field would be the most effective way to pursue
the gathering of information about Japanese capabilities and intentions.
Deciding how to apportion those responsibilities was not a simple task.
Tactical air warfare in the Pacific and Far East was the province of the
Navy, of Marine Corps aviation, of the AAF’s numbered air forces’ commanders,
and of the various Allied air forces. That region, far from Washington, had
no central air intelligence function, although the different AAF commands
produced some first-rate analytical products and exchanged information with
one another and with Nimitz’s Navy headquarters in Honolulu. Radio intercept
operations of the Army and Navy in Washington and Honolulu sponsored the
very important collection and preparation of periodic air OB lists, which
supported the various tactical air campaigns. Much more work had to be done
to support the planned strategic bomber offensive of the Twentieth Air Force.
AAF headquarters in Washington also served as the staff of the Twentieth, and
the A-2 quickly assumed a significant part of the role of intelligence support for
the B-29 very long-range bomber program. The problems facing the target
planners were considerable, for they had little data about Japan on which to base
a coherent analysis or to create target charts. This had already been recognized
in the spring of 1943 when a major reorganization of the A-2 office aimed at
improving intelligence production. That reorganization, however, was but one
of many that accompanied the changes incident upon the relentless Allied
prosecution of the war against Japan.’
The period 1943-1945 in Washington saw five men serve as AC/AS,
Intelligence, a turnover rate that produced problems. Brig. Gen. Edgar P.
Sorenson held the job from June 22, 1942, until October 22, 1943; he served
also as a member of the COA. He seems to have left in some disfavor, as Arnold
was not happy with the overall state of air intelligence and possibly also with
Sorenson’ s opposition to the COA’ s recommendations about Japan and to the
COA’s very existence. The next incumbent, Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, served
for only a few months before handing the job to Brig. Gen. Thomas D. White
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