Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
Moss’s target section did undertake a series of air intelligence estimates of
western Axis industries in late 1942 which were incorporated into the later
Report of the COA.35
While Eighth Air Force could rely on major British assistance, AAF forces
in North Africa depended more on A-2. Of 364 target charts completed by the
end of October 1942,213 addressed potential targets in Africa or Spain, while
113 more in final preparation covered targets in Italy.3h Special studies
completed in 1942 in support of pending operations in North Africa included
“Airfield and Topographic Information’’ on Spain, North Africa, and the
Casablanca area (February 1942); “Information for TORCH” (September 1942);
“Target Information on Italy, Sardinia, and Balearic Islands” (September 1942);
and “RRTargets: Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia” (June 1943)?7 References to Spain
were based upon the uncertain reaction of that country to the Northwest African
landings. Should Spain join the Axis alliance, knowledge of that country would
prove essential.
Colonel McDonald-an old-line Air Corps intelligence officer and A-2 of
Twelfth Air Force, NAAF and MAAF, in 1942 and 1943-judged HQ AAF
A-2 estimates of enemy industries and transportation systems in North Africa
definitely useful for combat planning. He was more critical of the time and
expense spent in Washington to make the folders attractive. “The most useful
contribution from Washington could have been simple folders on individual
targets, including mimeographed and photographic and photostat material . . .
sent forward promptly as soon as the information could have been prepared.”
Charts and folders for Italy that came from Washington were of little help
because they were based on outdated inf~rmation.~~ By early 1943 the NAAF
had facilities in Algiers to provide all charts needed for the Mediterranean. The
NAAF, like the Eighth and Twelfth Air Forces, indicated it no longer needed
HQ AAF chart^.^'
At the same time, A-2 sections were addressing items of interest in the
Pacific as well. Even before the outbreak of war, A-2 had undertaken the
preliminary “Survey of Japanese Iron and Steel Industry.” In 1942 special
studies included those on flying conditions in Japan; Japanese aircraft, copper,
and steel industries, air defenses, and shipping; and target priorities. Of the 105
objective folders published between October 1942 and May 1943,69 focused
on targets under Japanese contr01.~’ Because of the scarcity of current
information on conditions in Japan (the result of Japanese efforts to prevent
intelligence collection in the 1930s) much of this material would prove of
limited value. Nevertheless, it was illustrative of ongoing efforts in the early
months of the war.
Technical air intelligence in the early 1940s experienced the same
fluctuations and evolutions as those affecting other aspects of air intelligence.
The U.S. Army Air Corps had gathered some technical data in China in the late
1930s regarding the Japanese Army Air Force. Although not revealed at the
121