Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Introduction
the direction of Edward L. Bowles, head of the communications division of the
department of electrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, and later the aerodynamics expert, Theodore von KfirmAn, of the California
Institute of Technology.’ But the existence of COA, independent of the Air
Staff, was to many air intelligence officers an indictment of their work, showing
that Arnold did not trust his own A-2 to undertake the targeting assignment-at
least that was the impression of Brig. Gen. Edgar Sorenson, chief of A-2 at that
time.
If the hesitancy of the commanding general to place full faith and trust in
his intelligence specialists meant that he judged the young air force to be short
of all the skills needed for independence, it surely implied that A-2 lacked
public and professional stature. Perhaps this accounted for the frequent changes
in the wartime officers assigned as AC/AS, Intelligence. It may also have kept
A-2 from competing effectively with the other service intelligencechiefs for the
resources available, thus leaving the AAF at an operational and political
disadvantage.
Air intelligence within the AAF did compete with other service intelligence
agencies. Turf scraps over roles, missions, and prerogatives continued
throughout World War I1 and into the postwar period. The most prominent
among the A-2’s rivals, and the organization most reluctant to give the Air
Staff‘s intelligence office an unfettered hand, was the War Department General
Staff, G-2. The G-2 served as the main intelligence agency for the U.S. Army,’
setting policy and controlling subordinate offices’ activities and relationships
with other agencies. Since the AAF was a branch of .the Army, one or another
of the G-2’s components could be quick to perceive a future diminution of its
own operation and, in classic bureaucratic fashion, refuse to affirm the need for
an independent A-2, or even the need of the A-2 to conduct what easily might
be recognized as pressing air intelligence duties. The enormous undertaking of
the war eventually forced some bureaucratic moderation and increased
autonomy for the A-2; the Army’s main intelligence office, even with its own
internal air intelligence unit, simply could not meet all of the demands for
intelligence information.
Although G-2 staff offices gave up some of their control and allowed
increased latitude of action for A-2 during the war, they always did so
informally. The G-2 chief retained formal authority and responsibility for all
Army intelligence matters, including those of the AAF. By war’s end, the A-2
still existed rather ambiguously as a temporary wartime expedient. The
frustrations of those who worked for air intelligence around the world, but most
especially in Washington, reflected the general frustrations of many in the AAF
who sought recognition as a separate and equal service.
Some in the AAF (and its A-2 office) unquestionably viewed the Army’s
ground officers (and its G-2) as a malevolent force intent on suppressing the air
arm (and its intelligence function), but that perception was unfair. In some
7