Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
Despite ULTRA’S key role, in the spring of 1944 no one in the target section of
Fifteenth Air Force headquarters was cleared to handle it. The special security
officer, whose primary purpose was to monitor the enemy’s air OB and handle
ULTRA for the commanding general, frequently assisted headquarters personnel
with his special wisdom, obtained as a result of his special access to sensitive
material.4s Later that summer, an indoctrinated officer joined the target section
with responsibility to coordinate and blend ULTRA into other intelligence.
General strategic targeting guidance for Fifteenth Air Force was provided
in directives from the Commanding General, USSTAF. Except for joint Eighth
Air Force-Fifteenth Air Force operations, each air force commander had
considerable leeway in selecting specific targets within the overall parameters.
The heart of the intelligence assessment-planning-operations process at
Fifteenth Air Force was the daily planning meeting (also called the targeting
meeting) attended at 11 o’clock each morning by some thirty officers. Earlier
in the day, the A-2 had met with members of his section to assess developments
over the past twenty-four hours, review damage resulting from previous strikes,
and select recommended targets in coordination with weather and operations.
The A-3 generally chaired the 11 o’clock meeting in the capacity of a deputy
for operations. After the weather officer outlined the areas available for
operations, intelligence presented the recommended list of targets and the
rationale for their selection. The ULTRA officer projected the probable GAF
reaction under the guise of an enemy OB expert, and the flak officer addressed
known concentrations of AA batteries. After detailed questions and answers, the
A-3 made his decision and dictated an operations order. According to the
Fifteenth Air Force’s history, “In general, .whenever there were reasonable
prospects of success, the recommendations of A-2 were accepted.”46
With the German decision to contend the length of the peninsula rather than
to retreat northward and the Allied decision to focus on western Europe in 1944,
the war in Italy became a slugging contest marked by skillful German defenses
and slow Allied advances. Even before the first Allied infantryman came ashore
at Salerno, airmen had recognized that the primary role of air power in this
theater-after the GAF’s defeat-would be interdiction. Bombing the lines of
communication in Italy had been ongoing since the previous spring in support
first of the North Africa campaign and then of Operation HUSKY. In June 1943,
NAAF intelligence officers concluded, “Railroad targets as a category assume
an importance second only to targets affecting the neutralization of the enemy
air potential.” The officers reasoned that if the Axis rail net was destroyed, “a
collapse would be ine~itable.”~’ Between June 1943 and the end of the year,
numerous diversions sidetracked the development of a systematic interdiction
campaign. In a special intelligence report published the day before Christmas,
Colonel McDonald provided what would be the thrust of air operations in Italy
for the rest of the war. McDonald concluded that interdiction efforts to date had
been relatively ineffective because they had lacked focus and thus a concentra-
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