Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
numbered air force. He emphasized the importance of technical intelligence but
noted the mission was not being handled well. AT1 was not coming in from
Alaska, Hawaii, India, or China. Although a workable system of technical
intelligence was in effect in the SWPA, only a fraction of captured Japanese
equipment was available for scrutiny there. To alleviate the lack of capability
to provide acceptable analysis of matbriel, the A-2 recommended that Sorenson
be authorized to establish a captured air equipment center at a location where
most required facilities were available or easily procurable.”
While the AAF attempted to improve crash intelligence, the U.S. Navy
conducted a similar activity at a captured enemy equipment unit set up in early
1943 at the AnacostiaNaval Aircraft Factory outside Washington D.C. The JIC
proposed a joint technical air intelligence activity in which the Anacostia unit
would handle a major portion of the work. The proposal was shelved because
neither service was prepared to work with the other. In June 1943 the Navy
resurrected the proposal, suggesting the Army be in charge of a “test section”
at Nashville, Tennessee, while the Navy supervised a “development section” in
Washington to produce and disseminate timely technical aviation data.45 At this
point, another matter impinged upon the proposal for joint crash intelligence.
In North Africa, General Eisenhower had sponsored a Joint Intelligence
Collection Agency (JICA) under his G-2. Sorenson initially thought the JICA
would merely collect information and forward it to the United States. When the
JICA requested assignment of an experienced air technical officer, however,
Sorenson provided Lt. Col. Byron R. Switzer from his own
Soon afterward, AAF Intelligence requested information from JICA on the
use of laminated methyl methacrylate in the canopy of the German FW 190.
From North Africa, McDonald rebuked Sorenson for going to an “outside
ground agency” with his request for the Focke-Wulf canopy. McDonald
informed Sorenson that he was sending a Messerschmitt 109G and a FW 190,
both flyable, to Wright Field for testing. “In closing,” he wrote, “I may add that
the type of Intelligence which has contributed most to the air, sea, and ground
operational successes in the Libyan and Tunisian Campaigns is Air Intelligence
developed and applied by personnel who have an appreciation of air values. .
. . It therefore behooves the Air Force to maintain a high degree of control over
all matters pertinent to air intelligence and not pass it on to personnel who are
not particularly qualified to do justice to it.” Sorenson defended himself by
explaining that JICA had a courier aircraft to and from the United States and
therefore was thought best able to get a canopy to Wright Field quickly. “I agree
with you,” Sorenson wrote, “that Air Intelligence is the most important
intelligence yet developed in North Africa. Further, that the old conventional
G-2-ON1 [organization] is out of date. However, since we are not going to be
able to do away with the latter in one fell swoop, the best solution is to
impregnate it with those who are Air Intelligence minded.”47
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