Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
November 1943 to provide another arm of the strategic air campaign against the
Third Reich, flew 53 percent of its missions against German lines of communication.’
The combined air commands established in North Africa would
continue throughout the war, only changing their names from Northwest
African to Mediterranean when they moved to Italy. They would continue to
provide policy and overall guidance, while each nation’s tactical air forces
generally provided direct support to their own ground armies.
In the strategic air war against Germany, the spring of 1943 saw the
initiation of the CBO. Based in the first instance on the report of the COA as
amended by the Eaker Plan, in practice the American daylight strategic
bombing campaign would continue to be influenced by operational considerations
such as force size, weather, and the unanticipated strengthening of the
German air defenses. The most important organizational development in the
strategic air war was the creation in December 1943 of the USSTAF. Under the
command of Lt. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, HQ USSTAF was to provide coordination
and centralized control to both Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. Despite this
reorganization, Anglo-American political and military leaders clearly viewed
the strategic bombing campaign as an adjunct to land force operations against
Germany. This relationship was underscored in the spring of 1944 when the
CCS placed strategic as well as tactical air forces under the operational control
of the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLOR-the amphibious
assault on the continent.
Technologically, the most important event in this period was the arrival of
the long-range P-5 1 escort fighter. The impact was magnified by the simultaneous
arrival of enough heavy bombers to inflict serious damage on German
targets day after day instead of only several days amonth. The first result of this
combination was the reduction of the Lujiwuffe from being capable of
preventing effective attacks on selected targets to being a serious nuisance. In
the same period the oil industry was finally recognized by Allied decision
makers as the most critical element of the enemy’s industrial and military
potential.
The full impact of this recognition and these new operational capabilities
would be delayed by two diversions imposed from above. The first was General
Eisenhower’s decision directing the strategic bombers to focus on German
transportation networks in France and the Low Countries in support of
OVERLORD. The second was the emphasis placed on destruction of the German
V-weapons. While some strategic missions continued to be flown against
targets in Germany, it was not until the autumn of 1944 that the full weight of
American daylight bombing would fall upon the German oil industry. Even
then, a large percentage of strategic missions were directed against targets
selected for their near-term impact on the ground situation. The introduction of
German jet aircraft, although raising serious concern when American airmen
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