Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Taking the Offensive
operational air unit even less than had the Thirteenth under SOPAC. The
Seventh’s groups and squadrons flew for the various task forces, while the
headquarters gave administrative and logistic support. Although the Seventh Air
Force’s position (or plight, depending upon one’s point of view) caused other
AAF leaders like General Kenney much grief throughout the war years, the
organization served Admiral Nimitz well and suited the Navy’s operational
style. The Seventh’s commander, Maj. Gen. Willis Hale, rarely used intelli-
gence in forming plans and assigning tasks until late in the war. These functions
fell instead to the various air commanders of the task forces.60
The air intelligence produced by JICPOA and used by the Seventh’s groups
included regular interception of Japanese weather reports from an excellent
system of observation, air OB information, and air operations analyses, plus a
variety of charts, maps, books, and similar materials. The Seventh Air Force’s
intelligence officer had little to do with original analysis; early in the war he
served largely as a briefer and an information conduit. Not until the campaign
for the Gilberts late in 1943 and the Marshalls early in 1944 did the Seventh’s
intelligence section achieve any real importance; even then it was still
subordinate to the Navy’s air operations and did little to influence war planning.
Although size comparisons can mislead, the number of people authorized for
the Seventh Air Force’s A-2 section varied between 1943 and 1945 from one-
fourth to less than one-half that of the Fifth Air Force ADVON A-2 in New
Guinea. In April 1943, of the 10 officers assigned to the Seventh Air Force’s
A-2 section in Honolulu, 1 worked with combat intelligence, 2 handled the
command’s public relations matters, 6 were photointerpreters, and 1 did
counterintelligence. The director and his administrative and executive help
rounded out the officer authorizations, while 24 enlisted men completed the
staff. A July 1943 request to increase the A-2 section’s strength to 27 officers
and 57 enlisted found favor locally, but not at AAF headquarters in Washington,
which saw little reason to assign scarce talents to offices that did secondary
work. The demands of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaigns taxed the
limited intelligence staff, which leaned increasingly on the resources of
JICPOA, especially for radio-intercept data, air OB formulations, and technical
intelligence, In recognition of the large amount of photointerpreter work being
done by the Seventh both in Hawaii and at its advance echelon on Tarawa, the
AAF added a photographic intelligence detachment on February 7, 1944. The
detachment had authorizations for 43 officers and49 enlisted. All personnel had
to come from General Hale’s own organizational resources; the supply of
trained people was slim.
The situation on Hale’s staff reflected in part the very haphazard growth of
the A-2 section through the first two years of fighting. The state of the
intelligence office’s manpower strength also reflected the reluctance of the
AAF’s headquarters to assign people to jobs that could or should be accom-
plished by Admiral Nimitz’s joint center. Washington’s reluctance to add to
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