Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Planning the Defeat of Japan
target analysis and damage assessment of the Japanese homeland, first-rate
aerial photography was vital, yet it did not begin in substance until November
1944 when Hansell’s F-13 crew made their initial flight.
White noted also that the AAF’s pictures, most taken from high altitude,
were inferior to those of the Navy, usually made from 6,000 to 8,000 feet. The
low-altitude photographs were much more useful, for they showed the areas
observed in greater detail. The appreciation of photography displayed at
headquarters reflected the experience of air commanders in India-Burma and in
Europe. Good aerial photography served the target planners well, for despite its
drawbacks it was more quickly adaptable to the analytical process than was the
written, sometimes more ephemeral or arcane, collection of data from captured
documents, POWs, crashed aircraft, and intercepted messages that might
indicate the enemy’s capabilities or intention^.^' The dearth of information on
Japan, especially photographic, had serious consequences in operations
planning, directly affecting decisions on the tactics and types of bombs to be
used on Japanese cities.
German and Japanese Interchanges and Implications
for the War on Japan
As the Allies moved across France in 1944, Arnold’s thoughts centered more
and more on how to deal with Japan and the postwar shape of his Air Force. The
thoughts became linked in his mind late in the summer as he formulated several
ideas dealing with both topics. In September of that year, President Roosevelt
directed Secretary of War Stimson to organize an “impartial and expert study
of the effects of the aerial attack on Germany.”42 The study, actually one that
Arnold sought, was to be all-encompassing, covering both direct, physical
damage and the indirect consequences of the CBO on the German economy. In
its final form, this study was the product of civilian-led group and came to be
called the USSBS. In charge of the survey was Franklin D’Olier, chief executive
of the Prudential Insurance Company. The origins of the USSBS were many and
diverse; A-2’s Target Information Section, in particular Maj. Ralph A. Colbert,
chief of its European Branch in early 1944, played a key role. In Colbert’s view,
his section required a continuing evaluation of the effects of its recommenda-
tions regarding targets to be struck. “Plans should be prepared now,” he wrote
to General White on March 27, 1944, “for the establishment of a Commission
of experts, headed by USAAF Intelligence, prepared upon Germany’s defeat to
conduct an investigation inside Germany that will disclose the true facts
concerning the Strategic Aerial Bombardment of Europe. . . .” As things
eventually turned out, AC/AS, Plans subsequently took the lead away from A-2
in establishing the survey, but Major Colbert managed to follow up his initial
interest by getting himself assigned to the survey and serving in its Economic
Section in Eur0pe.4~
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