Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
geography permitted, as there could be no assurance that any location was the
main point of attack. Japanese warning messages in mid-November had, in fact,
pointed out a number of possibilities, which the Allies at least briefly consid-
ered using. Lingayen, however, was the place best suited for the landing. The
main Allied force consisting of two corps reached Lingayen on January 7.
Ground resistance was light; air retaliation was not-it began several days
before the beach assault as the main body of Allied vessels moved west of
Luzon and minesweepers cleared the channels and approaches to Lingayen Bay.
Japanese suicide pilots tried to destroy as much of the invading amphibious fleet
as possible, while Yamashita completed his defensive preparations. Overall,
kamikaze pilots, joined this time by fast, 20-foot-long suicide boats, sank seven
Allied ships, including an escort carrier. Three battleships, four more escort
carriers, two American heavy cruisers, and an Australian cruiser suffered
damage, as did several other vessels. Despite the losses, Allied shipping was not
deterred, and Allied troops and support units quickly came ashore.”
The desperate suicide attacks prior to and during the landings at Lingayen
were the last organized Japanese air opposition on Luzon. Although Japanese
airmen based on Formosa remained a threat, the air war for the Philippines soon
ended. Allied capture of airdromes, first at Mangaladan and Lingayen, then at
Clark Field on January 28, coincided with the Fifth Air Force’s first B-24 day
attack on Formosa, on January 21. Gathering his thoughts as he looked back
over the fighting, Kenney noted that when the Army reached Clark, a quick
count found some 500 wrecked Japanese aircraft. Later a more formal survey
of Clark, Nichols, and Nielson Fields reported 1,505 nonflyable or destroyed
airplanes. The combined AAF-Navy counterair campaign not only destroyed
hundreds of aircraft, it had left many more partly flyable but missing vital parts,
and no opportunity for ground crews to repair them.88
Consolidation of American power in the Philippines was the final wartime
campaign for the FEAF, save for a continuing series of strikes on an ever
smaller array of Japanese shipping and on Japanese positions along the coast of
China. FEAF attacks on Japanese land targets continued until Japan surrendered
in the summer of 1945; attacks on both land and sea targets were coordinated
with the Navy and the Fourteenth Air Force. Kenney, now a full general,
participated in the preparations for the final assault on Japan proper, once
Okinawa had been secured by Nimitz’s POA forces. Preparations for taking
Japan included a reorganization of United States forces, with all AAF in the
Pacific except the Twentieth slated for transfer to FEAF. Acrimonious
infighting between the Army and Navy, much of it centering on the two strong-
willed leaders, Nimitz and MacArthur, delayed the reorganization. Despite the
arguments, FEAF’s bombers moved to Okinawa to carry out limited attacks on
Kyushu before the Japanese surrender.
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