Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
In place of marshaling yards, the captured officer listed six targets (four bridges,
one rail junction, and one main station) for attack.*53
The interdiction principles McDonald had suggested in December 1943
were employed in a very limited geographical area in January and February
1944 in support of the Allied landing at Anzio. They were incorporated into a
broader interdiction program with the initiation of Operation STRANGLE in
March 1944. The extent of the employment of all elements of MAAF against
German lines of communication were reflected in assessments of this network
by the intelligence sections of each of the major Allied air headquarters as well
as by the major operational units. Even before these plans, senior airmen had
suggested what intelligence had to provide to plan and execute an effective
interdiction campaign. As early as October 1943, Brig. Gen. Earle Partridge,
Chief of Staff, XI1 Bomber Command, “urgently recommended” the accumulation
of intelligence on the German supply situation in Italy as it related to rail
facilities. He suggested such questions as Where did military traffic originate?
What were the principal routes by which enemy supplies and reinforcements
flowed into central Italy? and Where were the major railheads and depots?54
In response, HQ Twelfth Air Force A-2 prepared a “Suggested Plan for
Making Impossible the Military Utilization of Italian Railways by the Enemy”
dated January 15, 1944.55 More limited analyses of lines of communication
vulnerabilities flowed from HQ MAAF in weekly rail traffic assessments and
from the 42d Wing (U.S. AAF) intelligence section.56 In the preoperation
planning for STRANGLE, the principal sources of information were photoreconnaissance,
studies of the Italian railway system, and analyses of previous
missions conducted against identified portions of the rail and road nets. These
included Inter-Service Topographical Department reports on segments of the
Italian railway, Photoreconnaissance Centre interpretation reports, conferences
with officials of the Italian State Railway, economic analyses by EOU, and
operational mission ~ummaries.5~
Despite the array of opposition, the initial STRANGLE directive adhered to
the priority of marshaling yards over bridges. As the campaign progressed, the
weight of assessed evidence, as reflected in periodic analyses compiled by
intelligence and operations staffs, fell more and more on the side of the bridge
theory.58 By April 1, Eaker had concluded that bridges and viaducts had been
found to be more useful targets than marshaling yards because they were more
difficult to repair and presented more effective obstacles to movement when
Air assault by itself could not achieve complete interdiction.
By the last stages of STRANGLE, an OSS study concluded, “Even very
effective attack on enemy supply lines will not produce results until the issue
*It seems likely Colonel McDonald had seen the results of this interrogation in
December, since the prisoner’s recommendations for an interdiction campaign in
central Italy were mirrored in McDonald’s special report of December 24, 1943.
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