Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Retrospection
dangerous was the air planners’ failure to recognize the enemy’s potential to
organize an effective air defense to thwart American efforts at implementing
strategic bombing doctrine or the enormous flexibility that the enemy’s
economic system possessed. The intelligence organization and knowledge did
not exist to support the implementation of AWPD-1. German economic and
industrial systems were broadly misunderstood; perhaps more serious was the
fact that American airmen were unaware of the extent of their ignorance. The
fog and friction of war made it difficult to acquire that knowledge. American air
plans for the destruction of the German economy consequently carried with
them serious misconceptions from the beginning as to how Germany worked
and what its most serious weaknesses were.
The two years preceding America’s entry into the war provided time for
further preparations and, perhaps more important, the opportunity for the
American military to learn from the experiences and mistakes of others. The
British, particularly after Churchill became Prime Minister, willingly shared
combat and intelligence experiences; American airmen were able to observe the
course of the air war over Europe from a front-row seat. Their willingness to
learn the lessons of combat achieved at the expense of others was somewhat
open to question.
The Battle of Britain provided a laboratory experiment to test the theories
of strategic bombing. The Lufhvuffe, in many ways the most up-to-date air force
in the world in 1940 (with technological devices such as blind bombing aids
that the RAF and AAF would not possess until 1943), formed up across the
English Channel to strike a decisive blow.” The Germans, with geographic
advantages that Allied air forces would not enjoy until the end of 1944, failed
utterly. Why they failed is obvious today, fifty years later, but it may not have
been so obvious then. Above all, the Germans did not devise and follow through
on a strategy aimed at gaining air superiority. They did not persevere in the face
of adversity, and they lacked either a coherent or a strategic approach. Among
other important lessons, it was apparent that a modern bomber force could not
accomplish its mission in the face of enemy fighters unless it had the protection
of a fighter escort. British society and industry proved adaptable, flexible, and
resistant to sustained bombardment from the air. The capacity to inflict
effective, long-term damage was going to prove far more difficult than prewar
air theorists had thought.
American observers saw little of this. American assessments attributed
heavy Luftwuffe bomber losses to inadequate bomber defenses and airframe
size, the low level at which the Germans flew their missions, and to poor
formation-flying discipline.” AWPD-1 argued the following summer that “by
employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good defensive power,
and high altitude,” American bombers would be able to penetrate deep into the
heart of Germany without unbearable losses.’* The impediment that enemy
fighters might represent still did not appear in the AAF’s plans. Escort fighters
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