Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
In these statements lies the resolution of the apparent discrepancy between
assertions that the GAF was “on the way downhill” and constant emphasis on
German air power as the first target for strategic air operations. In the fall of
1942, American airmen sought to ensure that the GAF remained in decline. If
allowed to recuperate from the blows Americans thought they were inflicting,
the Lujbvufle might become a formidable opponent. By the spring of 1943
Allied intelligence had begun to detect the rise in actual fighter strength in
western Europe and to glimpse the increases in single-engine fighter production.
In January they received agent reports of a meeting of fighter group commanders
that clearly indicated an expansion of the German fighter force. These
reports also provided the first indication of the development of the Me 262, Me
163, He 280, and the 30mm ~ann0n.I~’ In March, ULTRA revealed fighter units
moving to the west from Russia; the next month came information of similar
moves from the Medite~~anean.’~~
Precise figures were not necessary to realize that Eighth Air Force’s
daylight bombing offensive had captured Germany’s attention. Casualty figures
from each mission provided a clear enough indication. The result was not only
continued emphasis on the GAF but a realization that extermination through
aerial combat would not suffice. From this realization would come a renewed
emphasis on attacking single-engine fighter production. Even with this new
awareness, intelligence estimates continued to lag behind German production
and disposition. While Allied estimates for the first half of 1943 stood at 595
units per month, German factories were producing an average of 753. This
disparity increased throughout the year. Thus, when intelligence projected a
German monthly production of single-engine fighters in the second half of 1943
at 645, the enemy actually produced 85 1, over 200 more than the estimate.174
How an earlier understanding of the real production capabilities of the
German aircraft industry and a more realistic appraisal of enemy losses in the
daylight bombing campaign would have influenced that campaign is a moot
point. American air leaders were committed to a daylight, precision bombing
campaign, and it is unlikely they would have flinched even had they had a more
accurate picture. Such insight would almost certainly have prompted an even
stronger focus on the aircraft industry and a livelier appreciation of the need to
revisit supposedly destroyed factories more freq~ently.’~’ It might have hastened
the development of a long-range escort fighter. A more difficult question is
whether political and military leaders other than airmen would have supported
the strategic air offensive had they known what it would entail. Given the
continued opposition to strategic air operations within the U.S. Army and Navy,
it is conceivable that more accurate air intelligence would have resulted in less
extensive air operations.
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