Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The Pacific and Far East
On January 3,1943, Kenney saw a message that inspired him to try to cut
the Japanese supply lines between Rabaul and New Guinea. The Japanese
commander intended to run a convoy to Lae from Rabaul, and Kenney
suspected that it was the beginning of an attempt to push the Allies out of New
Guinea. Kenney believed that such a heavy blow could force the Allies out of
the Pacific war. Directing a reduced bombing effort to allow time to restore his
B-17 force, Kenney increased reconnaissance flights while sending all of the
operational bombers he could muster to attack Rabaul harbor with, so he
thought, the destruction of one ship and damage to six others on January 5. The
next day, P-38s with 1,000-pound bombs attacked a convoy of five transports
and five destroyers. No ship was hit. This disappointment was soon overcome.33
In late February 1943, Fifth Air Force reconnaissance of Rabaul harbor
showed increasing numbers of ships; on the 22d, airmen photographed seventy-
nine craft of assorted sizes. General Kenney badly wanted to attack them using
his newly modified B-25C-1 commerce raiders. His aircraft specialist, Maj.
Paul I. Gunn, affectionately called Pappy because he was likely in his mid-
forties, had installed eight forward-firing, SO-caliber machine guns in the noses
of the aircraft. Kenney itched to try out his new weapon; using both the machine
guns and low-altitude skip-bombing tactics, he intended to hit Rabaul as soon
as bad weather abated. In MacArthur’s office on the 25th, however, Kenney
read a Japanese message, intercepted and forwarded by the U.S. Navy, that
completely altered his plans. The Japanese intended to move some 6,900
soldiers to Lae to bolster the existing garrison of 3,500, using the prospect of
stormy weather to cover the convoy. The possibility of so many fresh troops
facing the tired and depleted American and Australian divisions caused General
MacArthur serious c0ncern.3~
Following an afternoon session in Brisbane with MacArthur on the 25th,
Kenney sent a courier to Port Moresby with a letter for Whitehead, telling him
about the intended convoy and its possible sailing date (between March 5 and
12). Kenney went on to tell his subordinate to postpone the Rabaul raid, prepare
for the customary preconvoy Japanese air attack by as many as 100 planes, step
up reconnaissance of and attacks on all Japanese airfields on New Guinea and
New Britain usable by Japanese fighters, and scale back flying as much as
possible to allow preparation of as many B-l7s, B-25s, and P-38s as possible
at the advanced Dobodura airfield. Flying the B-25s and P-38s to Dobodura
was a precaution Kenney took to ensure that unpredictable heavy weather over
the Owen Stanley Mountains did not interfere with the strike at the convoy.
Because of weather fronts that could cover ships, Kenney thought the Japanese
might move before the 5th. Having missed most of the January convoy to Lae
and knowing of the new Japanese intentions, Kenney did not want this chance
to slip a~ay.3~
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