Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
“advice as to priorities between the different systems of strategic objectives, and
the priorities of targets within these systems.”z4 On behalf of the RAF Deputy
Chief of Air Staff and the Commanding General, USSTAF, the committee
published a weekly priority list similar to the original Jockey schedules.
Between September and November, ordnance, military transportation, and AFV
production followed oil on the strategic target priority list. These three were
taken off the list on November 1 with the decision to concentrate on the German
transportation system. In February, when intelligence indicated a rise in
production of AFVs, they were reinstated, and a specific working committee
was created to monitor armored vehicles.
Intelligence on these systems came from now well-established sources.
USSTAF relied on the EOU’s general intelligence unit to analyze German
military equipment production.255 Photoreconnaissance and photointerpretation
agencies increased their work still further. In contrast to earlier periods, ULTRA
provided extensive quantitative and qualitative information on attacks against
individual targets, which contributed to accurate assessments. Much of this
information derived from decrypted police messages and codes now used by
military-industrial agencies created to coordinate production with military
requiremenkZ6 Cross-checking ULTRA information with photointerpretation
resulted in more accurate assessments and more effective subsequent targeting
decision^.^' The insight ULTRA now provided on the overall state of German
production and resources had strategic implications as well. Messages such as
the one from Oberkommando der Wehrmucht (the German high command) on
January 10, 1945, advising that because of critical shortages of ammunition it
would be possible only to supply active sectors while economizing elsewhere,
surely contributed to the CSTC recommendation that month to reinstate
ammunition to priority status.258
In response to the broadening target base, in January 1945 the USSTAF
director of intelligence expanded the daily briefing to the commanding general
to include considerable target intelligence, and he instituted special weekly
briefings to inform key staff officers of the status of target systems and
important individual targets. Although USSTAF was not responsible for
selection of ground-support targets, the operational intelligence section
established a special tactical targets subsection to keep Spaatz and his senior
officers informed of the ground situation and of important ground targets. This
group worked closely with the target committees in London and at SHAEF.
USSTAF intelligence also expanded the distribution of information to
subordinate commands, both strategic and tactical, to assist them in targeting.
American officers assigned to the Air Ministry were already sending a daily OB
to the tactical air forces and commands; it provided enemy units’ strength,
locations, and type of aircraft as well as a daily airfield activity report. In the
winter of 1944-1945, the USSTAF Air Ministry section sent daily signals on
the status of important ammunition dumps, ordnance, and POL depots; military
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