Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
In preparing their report, the committee members relied heavily on a
detailed study by the EOU. Prepared primarily by Capt. Harold J. Barnett, this
report pointed out that operational constraints had previously limited effective
attacks on target systems. With the increasing size, escort capability, and
extended range of the American bomber force and the concomitant decline of
the GAF, target systems that contained as many as fifty or sixty individual
targets now had become feasible. For this reason, oil, which had always been
considered an important target but one too dispersed and beyond range to have
been assigned a top priority, now assumed new importance. After reviewing in
detail the ten primary target systems, Barnett concluded oil had moved
conclusively to the forefront. “No other target system,” he asserted, “holds such
great promise for hastening German defeat.”Iz5 A successful oil campaign would
have a decisive impact on the enemy’s industrial and military capabilities. It
would reduce industrial production across the board, decrease strategic mobility
of the German Army (and thus support OVERLORD), hamper air operations, and
in general reduce the Wehrmacht’s tactical air-ground combat capability. The
destruction of twenty-three synthetic plants and thirty-two refineries, an
objective now within the Eighth’s and Fifteenth’s capabilities, would result in
“virtually zero” production within six months.Iz6
Accepting the basic premises, conclusions, and even much of the language
of Barnett’s study, the committee placed the petroleum industry (with special
emphasis on gasoline) as first priority, arguing that the projected objective of
a 50-percent reduction within six months would provide the “maximum
opportunity” for strategic bomber forces to affect the German ground forces.
Continued policing of the enemy’s fighter and ball-bearing industries would
provide Allied air superiority and deny the GAF an effective air-ground
capability. According to the planners, the strategic forces would shift to attacks
against the German transportation networks in occupied Europe in the three
weeks immediately preceding D-day as they continued to keep the Lujbva#e on
the defensive in the skies over Germany.’”
Intelligence sources outside USSTAF agreed with the committee’s
conclusions. At the request of the Air Ministry, the MEW evaluated the
USSTAF plan. While differing in some statistical data and suggesting a slightly
different timing, MEW replied, “Our final conclusion differs little from that of
[USSTAF] . . . . We fully endorse their expectations of the strategic results
which would follow [from concentrating on the oil industry]. . . .”128 As
evidence of the state of German petroleum, in a report on the MEW position,
EOU included the text of a German order signed by the quartermaster general
of the high command of the German Army. Stressing the need to avoid a crisis
in motor fuel, the message concluded, “The Order of the Hour for motor fuel .
. . is: Economize now wheneverpossible.” According to EOU, both the urgency
of the message and its origin “make it one of the most striking evidences of the
German oil position which we have thus far received.”’2Y Shortly thereafter,
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