Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The Pacific and Far East
plus Navy and Marine squadrons to bomb Rabaul as well as to attack radar
warning sites on its approaches as often as possible. AAF joined in the attack
from New Guinea, catching many newly arrived Japanese ships in the harbor
on November 5. The timing was not coincidental; Allied intelligence analysts
had forecast the Japanese naval force’s arrival from radio intercepts.
Thirteenth Air Force received its intelligence material from several sources,
depending on the particular mission to be undertaken. For example, Halsey
ordered the November 11, 1943, raid on Rabaul by the Thirteenth’s heavy
bombers and naval carrier aircraft to support the force operating at Empress
Augusta Bay. He decided on the time and composition of the attacking force
based on his understanding from ULTRA of the Japanese presence. Responding
to Halsey, the Thirteenth’s planners picked their target aiming points from
recent photography of Rabaul and surrounding airfields. This was important,
for, as heavy bombers were to go in first to reduce opposition, their strikes had
to be as accurate as possible. Carrier aircraft were to follow and work over
shipping and other targets. So detailed was the intelligence and so effective the
planning for these air strikes that by the end of the month, Rabaul ceased to be
a major threat, although the Thirteenth and other SOPAC air units made
periodic reconnaissance attacks. The Japanese now tried to counter Allied gains
by shifting the focus of their operations to western New Guinea, Truk, and the
mandated Pacific islands?’
As it became apparent that Rabaul’s garrison was increasingly isolated and
less able to present a major threat, the Thirteenth’s aircraft turned to the
Caroline Islands. On March 29, B-24s made the first daylight bomb run over
Truk Atoll, littering the airfield on Eten Island with aircraft destroyed on the
ground. On June 15,1944, control of the Thirteenth Air Force passed to Kenney
and the new FEAF, but the force continued to support Navy operations in the
Carolines, Saipan, and Yap Islands. The new AAF organization gave the
Thirteenth’s A-2 a greater influence in combat operations planning?*
As the Thirteenth cooperated in multiservice operations in the Solomons, the
AAF continued to fight successfully in New Guinea. By May 1943, intelligence
collection and assessment became so well developed that Whitehead regularly
received a flow of reports of Japanese air activity almost as quickly as the
Japanese moved. On May 14, at dusk, the general knew that a few hours earlier
Japanese aircraft had landed at Lae. That night he sent a squadron from
Dobodura to attempt to destroy the newly arrived enemy. Bad weather
precluded any success, however. The next morning, Whitehead tried again, this
time with a flight of A-20s. Once more bad weather interfered. On the 15th, the
intelligence staff passed Whitehead another report (probably based on coast-
watcher observations and the interception of Japanese air traffic control radio
transmissions) of nine bombers refueling at Lae, followed by their departure to
the southeast at 4:21 PM. Such a flow of intelligence data made the jobs of air
275