Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
disagreed with Whitehead’s low estimate of Japanese forces, offering instead
his opinion of some 4,050 troops on Los Negros. After an hour and a half‘s
discussion by MacArthur, Kenney, Vice Adm. Thomas D. Kinkaid (MacAr-
thur’s naval commander), and Chamberlin, MacArthur accepted Kenney’s
proposal, and set the action for February 29. With little time available, planning
and force preparation began immediately.64
To obtain additional information, a scouting party from Lt. Gen. Walter
Krueger’s Sixth Army went ashore on Los Negros on February 27. Picked up
the next morning by a Catalina flying boat, the men returned to report that, in
Kenney’ s phrase, “the place is lousy with Japs.” Kenney discounted the possible
danger, quieting the fears of Whitehead and Whitehead’s chief of staff, Col.
Merian C. Cooper, by pointing out that any soldiers on the island would
naturally have been where the patrol encountered them just to avoid the
bombing attacks around Momote airdrome. Kenney also believed that the area
the scouts checked was far too small to reflect the true enemy situation.
Moreover, aerial reconnaissance of Wewak and Tadji airfields revealed no
aircraft staging forward from Hollandia that could hazard the landing force.
Kenney continued his belief in the value of taking Los Negros and then Manus,
writing in his notes that he was certain that his scheme would succeed. Plans
had advanced so far, with troops of the 1 st Cavalry and Seabees embarked, that
MacArthur, aboard the cruiser Phoenix to observe the operation, was reluctant
to change at that late date based on the patrol’s report.65
In fact, Col. Ezaki Yoshio, the Japanese commander on Los Negros, had
hidden his 4,000 or so men in the jungle, forbidding both AA fire or movement
during daylight and prohibiting any repairs to trails, roads, or structures
damaged by bombardment. The island appeared largely deserted by the
Japanese, with much of the apparent evidence favoring Kenney’s suggested
course of action. The Allied force of about 1,000 men landed shortly after 8 AM
on the 29th, quickly quieted the initial opposition with help from naval gunfire,
and took Momote airdrome and the surrounding area. At that point, MacArthur
decided to move ahead with the Admiralties’ seizure, sending for the backup
reinforcements. Because of bad weather with low clouds, Whitehead’s B-25s
and fighters could give only limited support. That night, the Japanese began a
series of heavy but uncoordinated attacks, with enemy soldiers recapturing part
of the airfield. The following day, clearing weather allowed bombing and
strafing in support of the 1 st Cavalry Division’s men on the ground. Forced onto
the defensive by the more numerous enemy, the Allies dug in at positions
around a reduced perimeter, where grim and desperate fighting blunted the force
of the Japanese reaction. Reinforcements arrived on March 2, but the stubborn
enemy resistance continued as the Japanese fought to the last. Air operations
from Momote began with light aircraft using the field as early as the 6th. By
March 8, most of the struggle for Los Negros was over. The focus of fighting
then shifted to neighboring Manus Island. The main struggle for Manus lasted
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