Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Taking the Offensive
The number, locations, and vulnerabilities of vital installations within
each industry.
That industry’s recuperative power.
The time lag between destruction of installations and the desired effect
on frontline strength:’
The study, by its nature, required substantial understanding of the industrial,
transportation, and military relationships in Japanese society. This knowledge
remained skimpy and ill-defined.
In September 1943, the COA began working with Hansell, who had by then
become the Chief of Staff of the XX Bomber Command, the unit that was to
deploy to India and China and be the first to use the B-29 in the war. The
committee sought information as to the new airplane’s capabilities which gave,
in turn, a chance for the XX Bomber Command to correlate its intelligence
actions with thoseof theCOA.’3 In making its assessments, the committee faced
difficult problems. Information on Japan was fragmented, limited, and of
undetermined worth. In some cases it quickly became clear that analyses would
have to be drawn inferentially, by comparing Japan’s supposed industrial
operation with that of America and of other countries. The members labored
throughout the summer and fall of 1943 to assemble material and form their
recommendation^.'^
The Cairo conference of Allied leaders in November and December 1943
became the first stage on which the COA’s recommendations about Japan
would play. To achieve an immediate role for the B-29s, Generals Arnold,
Hansell, and Kuter presented their employment proposal based upon a
preliminary assessment from the COA of the Japanese iron and steel industry
and its vulnerability to attacks on coke ovens in Manchuria. These ovens at
Anshan and Penshian (near Mukden) produced 56 percent of Japan’s coke.
Since coke does not last in open storage, the committee believed that destruction
or disablement of the ovens (they could be damaged by shock from near
misses and take up to two years to repair) would have a substantial effect on
sheet steel fabrication, and thereby reduce shipbuilding. The Allied leaders at
Cairo approved use of B-29s for attacks on Japanese industry; with that
approval came a plan to base the aircraft in India, stage them through bases at
Chengtu, China, and hit the ovens along with other targets. The plan, called
MATTERHORN, was to be carried out by the XX Bomber Command under Brig.
Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe.*’’
*Preparation of an earlier version of the MATTERHORN plan miscarried because
of logistics problems. In that plan, 280 B-29s would fly from Chinese bases near
Chengtu, supported by 2,000 B-24s converted to cargo duties. Such an amount of
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