Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
To supplement these formal briefings, many SSOs prepared frequent
written reports on special topics such as V-weapons, jet fighter developments,
and enemy ground reinforcement^.'^ All routinely delivered priority incoming
signals or discussed their contents with the commanding general or other senior
officers several times a day. No standard operating procedure existed overall.
The Fifteenth Air Force ~JLTRA representative, for example, annotated signals
he deemed significant, and he hand carried them to the senior officers, but he
did not prepare written summaries or rep0rts.5~
At most headquarters, indoctrinated officers stopped by the SSO’s office
at least daily, often several times a day, to read signals or review appropriate
maps and charts.” The Ninth Air Force director of operations routinely
reviewed ULTRA-based charts on enemy airfields and bridges while considering
missions for the 9th Bombardment Division’s tactical bomber^.^' In southern
France the A-2 and A-3 consulted the XI1 TAC SSO before preparing
intelligence summaries or operations orders6’
In their decision to identify and segregate a single SSO to handle ULTRA
material, the American forces differed from their British allies. By the summer
of 1943, the latter had adopted a more integrated system in which selected
members of the regular intelligence staff processed ULTRA signals. In contrast
to the American SSOs, these individuals did not receive special training at BP
but were indoctrinated in place, as deemed necessary for the effective
performance of their intelligence responsibilities.61 The greater willingness of
the British to indoctrinate intelligence officers was reflected in joint intelligence
organizations such as the various headquarters under Mediterranean Allied Air
Command, most of which included several ULTRA-cleared RAF officers but no,
or at best one or two, indoctrinated Americans.62
One benefit of the British procedure was that it integrated ULTRA into the
larger intelligence picture at a lower level, a step several American SSOs
strongly recommended in their postwar reports.63 As evaluated by one American
SSO, such an arrangement allowed ULTRA to assume “its proper dimension of
another source of intelligence . . . rather than the conjuring act seen in some
subordinate American headquarters.” On the other hand, this individual also
observed that in the area of providing “special training in use and interpretation
of ULTRA [at BPI . . . the American system is superior.”64 Through the fall of
1944, in fact, the American system evolved into a modified version of this asneeded
arrangement, with subsequent improvements in ULTRA’S immediate
operational value. The Ninth Air Force SSO, for example, commented that the
indoctrination of the chief of the targets branch significantly enhanced ULTRA’S
usefulness in the targeting process. Unfortunately, this step did not occur until
March 1945.65
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