Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
headquarters, just as had occurred in Europe several years earlier. Had the war
continued, Spaatz’s stature and reputation, plus the magnitude of the work to be
performed, would probably have drawn the JTG itself (or at least much of its
work) to Guam.62
Army Air Forces Intelligence and the Atomic Bomb
The United States embarked upon development of atomic energy for military
uses at the urging of Albert Einstein and a number of prominent physicists. At
first, the work was spread out among a number of facilities under the overall
direction of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), headed
by Dr. Vannevar Bush. In the fall of 1942, atomic research came under the
purview of the U.S. Amy’s Manhattan Engineer District and came to be called
the Manhattan Project. Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Leslie R. Groves headed the
Manhattan District, but he received ample supervision from Bush, Dr. James B.
Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee (part of the
OSRD), General Marshall, and Secretary of War Stimson (from May 1, 1943,
Stimson had overall responsibility for the endeavor). Over the course of the
following few years, Groves also assumed responsibility for all of the security,
counterintelligence, and military intelligence related to the United States’s
development of nuclear physics. Ultimately, of course, President Roosevelt and
his successor in 1945, President Harry S. Truman, bore final responsibility for
the nuclear development effort, but both kept a loose rein on the work, allowing
Stimson and primarily Groves to bear the main effort of guiding the design and
construction of the atomic bomb.63 Concurrently, the AAF assembled and
trained the 509th Composite Group to deliver the atomic weapons.
Early in March 1945, Stimson began to take an increasing interest in the
employment of the atomic bomb. Since 1942, the Secretary of War had assumed
that when completed and tested, such a weapon would be used. On March 5,
Stimson conferred with his assistant, Harvey Bundy, and later with Marshall,
advising both that within a short time they would be involved with the final
decision of whether or not to use the weapon on targets in Japan. At about the
same time in early March, Groves and Marshall discussed the bomb’s use,
Groves pointing out the need to coordinate with the War Department’s
Operations Planning Division, which Groves had assumed would draw up final
plans. Marshall demurred. Citing security needs, he told Groves. to do the job
within his own organization and to keep the number of people involved to a
minimum. Groves then formed a target committee consisting of his deputy,
Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Farrell, Lauris Norstad from Arnold’s office, three of
Groves’s subordinates (Col. William P. Fisher, Dr. J. C. Stearns, and Dr. D. M.
Dennison), and Dr. William G. Penny of the British team at Los Alamos. Drs.
John von Neumann and R. B. Wilson also came from the Los Alamos team to
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