Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
intelligence used by tactical air forces was in good shape, “Airborne ‘Y’
problems have been long and painful.” Problems included lack of equipment
rugged enough for air operations, limited numbers of qualified individuals, and
conflicts between signals and intelligence over organizational responsibilities
for maintenance and operations. Despite an Air Ministry report that indicated
Eighth Air Force’s use of airborne operators rose from six per mission in July
1944 to twelve per mission in October of that year, the Eighth Air Force
Director of Intelligence reported in January 1945 that the Eighth was sometimes
lucky to get two Y operators airborne per mission.I6’
Even with these problems, airborne Y operators contributed in both Europe
and the Mediterranean to the accumulation of intelligence for postmission
analysis, particularly before ULTRA became prolific. In fact, an Eighth Air Force
report stated the airborne input, which was incorporated into the RAF’s
Canterbury Digests, was “the only basic source material of signals air
intelligence originated by Eighth Air Force.”166 In Italy, the role of the airborne
Y interceptors in postmission analysis was further enhanced because the
mountainous terrain in northern Italy took offensive bombers beyond effective
Allied radar and radio range much more quickly than the terrain in western
Europe did.
Y intelligence for American tactical air operations began in North Africa
and continued through the course of the war. In contrast to strategic air
operations from the United Kingdom, American tactical air forces developed
independent SIGINT service units. The first of these arrived in the United
Kingdom in the fall of 1942 to participate in Operation TORCH. During the
North African campaign, American SIGIT detachments remained under
British tutelage, with RAF Y-Service maint*g overall responsibility for all
SIGINT in the theater. Detachments of the Ainerican 849th SIGINT Company
supported the Allied invasions of Sicily and the Italian mainland. According to
the senior American intelligence officer in the theater, even in this period the
Americans continued to “rely on R.A.F. channels for information and general
direction^."'^' By early 1944, the decline of the GAF in Italy resulted in a
corresponding decrease in useful tactical air intelligence from radio interception.I6’
During preinvasion tactical air operations against Occupied Europe in the
spring of 1944, British Y-Service passed SIGINT to the Control Centre at RAF
1 1 Group, which acted as the operations center for the RAF units and IX Fighter
Command. The IX Fighter Command SIGINT officer was an integral member
of the Y staff at the center. In June, the advanced echelon of Detachment 3,3d
Radio Squadron (Mobile), began radio intercept operations with IX TAC on the
continent only three days after the initial landings at Normandy.16’ While this
detachment and follow-on units assigned to the other tactical air commands
maintained operational links with their British counterparts, their primary ties
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