Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

The European Theater of Operations
had a very limited effect on the now massive Allied air superiority, while quick
reactions by Allied pilots cost the Luffwufle some 300 planes.
Strategic Air Operations: Summer 1944 to Spring 1945
By September 1944, the Allied ground offensive had progressed far beyond
expectations. The prevailing opinion in the Allied camp was that the war with
Germany would be over by the end of the year. In the middle of the month, the
CCS removed the strategic air forces from Eisenhower’s control and placed
them under the Chiefs of Staff, RAF and AAF. The Deputy Chief of Air Staff
and the Commanding General, USSTAF, were to serve as their executive
agents. In practical terms, this shift had little impact either on operations or on
the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of strategic air intelligence. Within
weeks of securing a foothold in France, Eisenhower had given Spaatz a virtual
free hand to employ his strategic air By August the primary objective
of that employment clearly was the destruction of the enemy’s petroleum
industry and its reserve capacity.
Although he had implemented Eisenhower’s instructions to employ Eighth
Air Force against the German transportation network in western Europe in
support Of OVERLORD, the USSTAF commander and his staff continued to focus
on the German oil industry. In opposing the AEAF transportation program in
the early months of 1944, USSTAF leaders had argued that only by threatening
a system vitally important to Germany would the GAF be drawn into continued
air combat. Failure to so challenge the Lufnyuffe would negate the impact of Big
Week by providing the enemy an opportunity to rebuild. Such rebuilding
appeared to be underway by the spring of 1944. In a memorandum to the deputy
commanding general for operations on April 9, McDonald noted the losses of
the enemy fighter force in the first three months of 1944 had been 11 percent
higher than in the previous year because of the expanded American daylight
bombing campaign. The German high command realized this and had begun to
withhold fighters for homeland defense, even when this meant that strikes
against peripheral targets went unmolested. “Only maximum scale operations
deep in Gemany,” warned the director of intelligence, “assure us the excess of
wastage over production which is indispensable to the reduction of the German
Air Force.”226
Spaatz was absolutely convinced of the need to keep the GAF in a
weakened state lest his bombers face a revitalized foe after OVERLORD. He
threatened to resign unless he received authorization to conduct sufficient
strikes to draw the enemy into battle and further weaken his industrial base.227
Eisenhower consented; on May 12, 28, and 29, Eighth Air Force struck oil
complexes in Germany. In the same period, Fifteenth Air Force hit the refineries
at Ploesti. The German reaction to these raids, revealed through photoreconnais-
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