Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Building an Air Intelligence Organization
William D. Butler, Commanding General, Eleventh Air Force, Alaska, to send
a comprehensive story immediately by airmail on the September 14 action at
Kiska. On September 20th, Butler responded: “Am required by existing
agreement Chief of Staff and Cinch [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy] to
submit to Comtask [Commander Task] Force Eight for approval prior to send
msg. Will try to get it thro~gh.”’~
Two weeks later the Chief of the Air Staff, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemey-
er, forwarded directly to General Marshall a very strong memorandum stressing
the necessity for the Commanding General, AAF, to receive promptly full and
accurate information of the needs and requirements for training and equipment
of Air Forces units so these experiences could be assimilated and disseminated
to other commands throughout the world as quickly as possible. “Lessons
learned from combat experience with Japanese forces in Alaska today might
save pilots and planes in Australia tomorrow,” the memorandum intoned, and
“the most appropriate medium for evaluating and disseminating this vital
information . . . is the Headquarters of the Army Air Forces in Washington.” In
response to the Air Forces’ concerns, the War Department authorized overseas
Air Force units to send copies of technical and tactical information, operational
reports, and intelligence data directly to HQ AAF, in addition to sending the
same material upward through command channels.”
In July 1943 the AC/AS, Intelligence formally requested the creation of an
A-2/G-2 committee to study the relations of the two in air matters. Col. T. J.
Betts, Deputy G-2, and Col. W. M. Burgess, Chief, Informational Intelligence
in A-2, headed the joint committee. In its report, the committee pointed out that
while the MID had overall responsibility for the collection, evaluation, and
dissemination of military information, including that pertaining to the AAF, in
practice something of a division of labor had developed. While the G-2’s air
unit accomplished the detailed preliminary work for estimating enemy and
neutral air orders of battle, A-2 performed the detailed work on tactical and
technical air intelligence, airdromes, and related information. The committee
concluded that while there appeared to be “an appreciable duplication of work,”
it was in fact the minimum possible since the two units reported to different
masters, either to the Army G-2 and through him the Chief of Staff, or to the
Commanding General, AAF.30
In the midst of these ongoing organizational struggles, the officers and men
of AC/AS, Intelligence strove to fulfill the dual functions of that office: service
to the Commanding General, AAF, and support to the combat commands. In
executing these responsibilities, the Informational and Operational Intelligence
Divisions played the critical roles.
The Informational Intelligence Division’s general functions included
collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information about both enemy and
friendly air activities. It furnished the commanding general with situation
reports, prepared special studies on probable developments in tactical and
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