Piercing the Fog - Air Force Historical Studies Office

Piercing the Fog
By autumn, it was becoming increasingly obvious that a shortage of fuel
rather than a lack of either pilots or airplanes was the primary factor in
restricting the Lufhyuffe’s operations. On September 2, Jugdkorps ZZ, which
supported German armies in the west, reported 285 serviceable aircraft, but it
added that two groups could not fly that day “owing to lack of fuel.” That these
units were now operating on airfields in Germany suggested that fuel shortages
were systemwide and not merely the result of transportation dislocations in
forward area^.'^' Supporting functions suffered even more drastically. The
director of one of the GAF’s technical armament branches announced in
October, “All aircraft dry and no testing or ferrying possible.””’ According to
a USSTAF-directed study on ULTRA and American air operations, from
September onward “the files . . . become an almost continuous chronicle of oil
shortage e~erywhere.”’~~ Still, it must have been particularly satisfying for those
who put forward the oil plan to read a message of November 18 announcing
orders, probably from Goering: “Operations are to be ruthlessly cut down, i.e.,
operations must only take place when the weather situation and other prerequisites
guarantee promise of success.”’u In the face of such evidence, there could
be little doubt in the air commanders’ minds of oil’s continued priority.
Well before ULTRA began to provide information on the effects of oil
shortages on the Lufhyuffe, Spaatz had shifted the focus of American strategic
bombing from the German aircraft industry and the GAF itself. In response to
those who had cautioned against too hasty a de-emphasis on the GAF, the
commanding general declared in April 1944, “The requisite intensity of
Counter-Air Force actions . . . must now be judged by the principal Air
Commanders Relying largely on ULTRA decrypts, Spaatz advised his
Air Force commanders on September 1 that, except for jet production
installations, the German aircraft industry was not a priority target because the
lack of fuel and qualified pilots, not airframes, was what was hindering German
air operation^."^ ULTRA and other sources certainly supported this confidence,
but the condition of the GAF was evident from its relative inactivity as well.
Spaatz and his senior officers did not need special intelligence to tell them a
force that refused to seriously contest attacks on its homeland was a force in
trouble. In a letter to Arnold a month after OVERLORD, Spaatz commented on
“the latent weakness of the German Air Force,” observing, “It even appears that
the effectiveness of POINTBLANK was greater than we had anti~ipated.”~~’
Intelligence assessments from a variety of agencies through the fall of 1944
continued to confirm this assessment. In October, the EOU noted an increase in
the production of single-engine fighters from between 500 and 600 a month
earlier in the year to 1,400 a month. The economic analysts argued that neither
production nor first-line strength was critical. Because petroleum shortages
affected both operations and training, without which the expanding fleet would
be impotent, the heavy bombers should continue to concentrate on oil. Fighter
and fighter-bomber attacks on training bases continued to contribute to the
240